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THE NEW MORAL TURPITUDE TEST:  
          FAILING CHEVRON STEP ZERO 
 
Mary Holper 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
          In the waning days of the Bush administration, Attorney General 
Michael Mukasey decided In re Silva-Trevino, in which he reversed over a 
century of immigration law precedent by creating a new moral turpitude test.  He 
abandoned the well-entrenched “categorical approach,” the mechanism by which 
immigration judges decide whether a noncitizen is removable for a criminal 
conviction, and allowed judges to engage in a factual inquiry of whether an 
offense involves moral turpitude.  The Attorney General made such a broad, 
sweeping change through a process that allowed no input from affected parties, 
including the individual whose case became the new precedent.  In this article, I 
argue that courts should refuse deference to Silva-Trevino under “Chevron step 
zero.”  Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC introduced a well-known two-step analysis 
for courts to determine whether an agency’s decision deserved deference: first, 
courts determine whether Congress used clear language in the statute; second, if 
Congress was not clear, courts defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation.  
The Court later introduced what scholars call “Chevron step zero.”  In an 
important step zero decision, the Court decided United States v. Mead Corp., 
holding that courts should not defer to agency interpretations of law issued 
through informal procedures because such interpretations do not have the force 
of law.  I argue that courts should not defer to Silva-Trevino under Chevron step 
zero because the Attorney General did not decide the case using law-like 
procedures: the decision-making process demonstrated neither transparency nor 
careful consideration.   
THE NEW MORAL TURPITUDE TEST: FAILING  
CHEVRON STEP ZERO 
 
Mary Holper* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the waning days of the Bush administration, Attorney General 
Michael Mukasey decided In re Silva-Trevino,1 in which he reversed over a 
century of immigration law precedent by creating a new moral turpitude 
test.  Attorney General Mukasey altered the “categorical approach,” which 
immigration judges use to decide whether a noncitizen is removable for a 
criminal conviction.  Under the traditional categorical approach, 
immigration judges look only at the elements of the statute of conviction 
and, if necessary, the record of conviction, to determine whether the offense 
involved moral turpitude.  The new moral turpitude test is a total overhaul 
of the categorical approach; it allows judges to look behind the record of 
conviction and engage in a factual inquiry, thus potentially subjecting many 
more noncitizens to removal for a crime involving moral turpitude.   
The Attorney General’s broad, sweeping change to immigration law 
was not made through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.  
Indeed, he did not even notify the parties to the adjudication that he was 
contemplating a reversal of years of precedent.  Thus, parties had no 
opportunity to brief the issue; nor did outside groups have an opportunity to 
comment as amici until after the Attorney General already had published 
the decision.  Rather, the decision was made at the eleventh hour of the 
Bush administration, once the election results determined that a Democratic 
administration would gain control of the Department of Justice two months 
later.   
In this article, I argue that courts should refuse deference to Silva-
Trevino notwithstanding the principles of deference embodied in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC.2  Chevron 
introduced a now well-known two-step analysis to determine whether an 
agency’s decision deserves deference: first, courts determine whether 
                                                          
* Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law.  I would like to thank 
Dan Kanstroom, Nancy Morawetz, Al Brophy, Peter Margulies, Carl Bogus, David 
Zlotnick, Jared Goldstein, Jonathan Gutoff, Ed Eberle, Rachel Rosenbloom, Erin Corcoran, 
Ben Krass and Sarah Sherman-Stokes for their valuable comments to drafts of this article.  
I also would like to thank all of the participants of the New England Junior Scholars 
Conference on July 22, 2010, for their thoughts and suggestions.  Thanks also to Miles 
Uhde and Erin Paquette for their helpful research assistance. 
1 24 I&N Dec. 687 (AG 2008). 
2 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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Congress used clear statutory language; second, if Congress was not clear, 
courts defer to the agency’s interpretation, so long as it is reasonable.  The 
Court later introduced what scholars call “Chevron step zero – the initial 
inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all.”3  In an 
important step zero decision, the Court decided United States v. Mead 
Corp.,4 holding that courts should not defer to agency interpretations of law 
issued through informal procedures because such interpretations do not 
have the force of law.  I argue that courts should not defer to Silva-Trevino 
under Chevron step zero because the Attorney General did not decide the 
case using law-like procedures: the decision-making process demonstrated 
neither transparency nor careful consideration.   
In Part I, I describe the removal process for noncitizens and the 
categorical approach, the method by which immigration judges determine 
removability for a criminal conviction.  I also describe the Silva-Trevino 
decision, in which the Attorney General rejected the traditional categorical 
approach for resolving whether an offense is a “crime involving moral 
turpitude.”  In addition, I discuss the secretive process by which the 
Attorney General rendered the decision in Silva-Trevino.   
In Part II, I discuss different types of deference courts give to an 
agency’s decision, including the light amount of deference under Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co.5 and heavy deference under Chevron.  I focus on the Court’s 
decision in Mead, in which the Court refused Chevron deference, but 
permitted Skidmore deference, to an agency decision that did not have the 
force of law because it was not the product of formal procedures.   
In Part III, I argue that the Attorney General’s decision in Silva-
Trevino should not survive Chevron step zero because the decision-making 
process did not allow public input before significantly changing 
immigration law.  As the process by which the Attorney General made his 
decision did not ensure transparency or careful consideration, the Chevron 
analysis should not apply, pursuant to the Court’s decision in Mead.  I also 
discuss whether the Silva-Trevino decision’s binding effect and 
authoritative nature will lead courts to apply the Chevron analysis.   
In Part IV, I propose solutions for both courts and the agency to 
grapple with the Silva-Trevino decision.  As discussed in Part III, courts can 
refuse deference at Chevron step zero.  Another solution is directed at the 
agency: Attorney General Holder can reconsider Silva-Trevino by vacating 
the decision and commencing rulemaking.  He also can sua sponte 
reconsider the decision, but ask for briefing from affected parties before his 
                                                          
3 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006); Thomas W. Merrill 
and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L. J. 833, 836 (2001). 
4 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
5 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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final decision.  Either rulemaking or a more participatory adjudication 
would cure the process problems, allowing for public input that ensures 
transparency and careful consideration by the agency.   
 
I. THE NEW MORAL TURPITUDE TEST IN CONTEXT 
A. From Arrest to Removal 
 
Juan’s story illustrates the process by which a noncitizen journeys 
from the criminal justice system through the deportation system.6  Years 
after the completion of his sentence for larceny, during a traffic stop, the 
police officer contacts the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency 
(“ICE”), a subagency of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”),7 
who takes Juan into custody.8  A trial attorney who works for DHS files a 
charging document called a “Notice to Appear” in immigration court, thus 
commencing removal proceedings.9  The Notice to Appear charges Juan 
with a violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),10 for 
example, a conviction for a “crime involving moral turpitude” (“CIMT”).11       
The immigration judge, an employee of the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (“EOIR”) within the Department of Justice, decides 
Juan’s case.12  She first decides whether he is removable for such offense, 
i.e., whether he has been “convicted,” and, if so, whether his offense is a 
                                                          
6 Juan’s story is not a true story; however, it is based on sets of facts from different clients 
the author has represented. 
7 The Department of Homeland Security, which Congress created in 2002 by passing the 
Homeland Security Act, absorbed most of the immigration functions of the former 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, including the enforcement of immigration laws.  
See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135; 6 U.S.C. § 251.  
ICE became responsible for detention, removal and investigations.  See id.; “About ICE,” 
available at http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm.  
8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) ; 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(c).  This type of cooperation between states 
and ICE is facilitated by 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g),  under which ICE may enter into written 
agreements with states or localities in which state or local officers, with proper training, 
acts as ICE agents.  8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1), (2).  Currently, ICE has these types of 
agreements with seventy-one law enforcement agencies in twenty-six states.  Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, “287(g) Results and Participating Entities,” available at 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/section287_g.htm.   
9 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.13, 1003.14(a), 1003.15(c).  The 1996 reforms to the Immigration 
and Nationality Act discontinued the use of the term “deportation” and replaced it with 
“removal.”   
10 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b). 
11 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). 
12 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.0, 1003.12. 
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CIMT.13  If the judge finds Juan removable, he may apply for any relief 
from removal for which he is eligible.14  At a later hearing, the judge 
decides whether Juan merits that relief; she makes this decision after a trial-
like hearing in which both Juan and the DHS trial attorney may present 
evidence.15  At the conclusion of this hearing, the judge decides whether 
Juan will be deported or remain in the U.S.16  The two parts of a removal 
proceeding can be likened to a criminal trial: first the judge determines 
whether Juan is “guilty” (deportable); if so, she decides his “sentence” (if 
she grants him relief from removal, he stays in the U.S.).17 
Either Juan or the DHS trial attorney may appeal to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), a fourteen-member body18 that sits within 
EOIR and decides appeals of immigration judges nation-wide.19  At any 
point of this process, the Attorney General (“AG”) may vacate an 
                                                          
13 The process by which the judge determines whether a state offense is a CIMT is 
discussed more in Part IB, infra. 
14 One common example of relief from removal is cancellation of removal, which is a 
discretionary waiver for long-term permanent residents who have been convicted of a 
removable offense, where Juan must show that he has been a lawful permanent resident for 
at least five years, has resided continuously in the U.S. for at least seven years, and has not 
been convicted of an “aggravated felony.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  Other forms of relief 
include adjustment of status (= application for a greencard), see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255; 
asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a); withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) 
(which requires the applicant to show a 51% likelihood of persecution if removed, see INS 
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447-48 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 423-24 
(1984)); and  withholding or deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture 
(which requires the applicant to show a 51% likelihood that his government will torture 
him if he is removed, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-18) . 
15 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 
16 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.37.   
17 One form of relief, voluntary departure, would not allow Juan to stay in the U.S.  
Voluntary departure allows Juan to leave voluntarily, without the consequences of a 
removal order.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (stating that a 
noncitizen who has an order of removal is inadmissible for 10 years after the date of 
removal). 
18 The BIA is authorized up to fifteen members, although there are currently fourteen.  8 
C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1); EOIR Fact Sheet: Board of Immigration Appeals Biographical 
Information (August 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/fs/biabios.htm.    
19 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b).  The American Bar Association ( “ABA”) recently addressed 
the problems inherent in the current system, in which immigration judges and the BIA lack 
independence because they are located within an executive branch agency responsible for 
law enforcement; other problems with the system include inefficiency and perceptions that 
the system is both unfair and that judges lack professionalism.  See ABA Commission on 
Immigration, “Reforming the Immigration System: Proposals to Promote Independence, 
Fairness, Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases,” 
Executive Summary, 43-48 (2010).  The ABA proposed a restructuring of the current 
system, either by converting the judges and BIA into Article I judges or, in the alternative, 
creating an independent agency to adjudicate immigration cases.  See id. at 48. 
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immigration judge’s or BIA panel’s decision and certify an issue to him or 
herself.20  Once Juan has a final order of removal, either issued by the BIA 
or AG, he may appeal to the circuit court in which the immigration judge 
completed proceedings.21  On appeal, arguing against Juan is an attorney 
from the Office of Immigration Litigation (“OIL”) of the Department of 
Justice civil division.22  Circuit courts may hear issues of law or 
constitutional issues in immigration cases, as opposed to pure questions of 
discretion.23  In Juan’s case, this means that a circuit court will more likely 
hear whether his offense is a CIMT (a question of law), as opposed to 
whether he merits relief from removal in the exercise of discretion.24       
 
B. The Categorical Approach 
 
Juan was not convicted under a state statute named “the offense of 
moral turpitude.”  How does the immigration judge determine whether he 
was convicted for a CIMT?  The INA does not define CIMT in the same 
way that it defines, for example, what is an aggravated felony.25  Judges 
must rely on precedent decisions by the BIA and federal courts that define 
the term; for example, convictions involving fraud,26 theft27 and serious 
bodily injury28 all have been held to be CIMTs.   
                                                          
20 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(i). 
21 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). 
22 While DOJ civil division attorneys usually are generalists, OIL focuses exclusively on 
immigration cases.  See Margaret Taylor, Behind the Scenes of St. Cyr and Zadvydas: 
Making Policy in the Midst of Litigation,16 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 271, 293 n.122 (2002); 28 
C.F.R. § 0.45(k); see also Michael Herz and Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ 
Control of Litigation on Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1345-49 (2000) 
(discussing that some agencies can litigate on their own behalf while others are represented 
by the Department of Justice). 
23 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D).  Scholars have discussed the difficulty of separating 
issues of law from issues of discretion.  See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole 
in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703 
(1997). 
24 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D).   
25 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining twenty-one different categories of offenses 
that are aggravated felonies); see also Abdelqadar v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 668, 671-72 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (“ ‘[A]ggravated felony’ is a defined term, while ‘crime involving moral 
turpitude’ is not.”).  The term CIMT has been challenged as void for vagueness, but the 
term withstood that challenge in Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951). 
26 See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 227; In re Flores, 17 I&N Dec. 225, 228 (BIA 1980). 
27 A theft offense that punishes a defendant for permanently, as opposed to temporarily, 
depriving the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership is a crime involving moral 
turpitude.  See In re D-, 1 I&N Dec. 143, 144-45 (BIA 1941).  
28 See In re Sejas, 24 I&N Dec. 236 (BIA 2007); In re Fualaau, 21 I&N Dec. 475 (BIA 
1996). 
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Dating back to when “moral turpitude” first appeared in the 
immigration laws,29 courts have preferred an elements-based analysis to 
determine whether an offense involves moral turpitude.30  This analysis 
requires a judge to determine the elements of the criminal offense, i.e., the 
minimum acts that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt in 
order for the jury to convict.31  If the minimum conduct does not involve 
moral turpitude, an adjudicator cannot consider the underlying facts that led 
to the conviction.32  This approach, commonly called the “categorical 
approach,” later became the method by which immigration judges 
determined removability for firearms offenses, aggravated felony 
convictions and all other criminal grounds of removability.33  
The elements of a particular offense do not always line up neatly 
with the elements of the ground of removability.34  State statutes can be 
multi-sectional or disjunctive; often there are elements of the offense that fit 
within the removability ground and elements that do not.  When a 
noncitizen has been convicted under such a statute, which is called a 
“divisible” statute, immigration judges consult the record of conviction to 
determine the nature of the conviction.35  The record of conviction is limited 
to the documents upon which the jury relied to convict: the charging 
document and jury instructions.36  In the case of a plea, the plea agreement 
                                                          
29 The term “moral turpitude” first appeared in the immigration laws in 1891; the Act of 
March 3, 1891, excluded from the U.S. the following persons: 
All idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge, 
persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous or contagious disease, persons 
who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor 
involving moral turpitude, polygamists, and also any person whose ticket or 
passage is paid for with the money of another or who is assisted by others to 
come, unless it is affirmatively and satisfactorily shown on special inquiry that 
such person does not belong to one of the foregoing excluded classes… 
Act of March 3, 1891, Ch. 551 (Fifty-first Congress, Sess. II). 
30 See United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1914).  For a longer 
discussion of this elements-based analysis, see Rebecca Sharpless, Toward a True 
Elements Test: Taylor and the Categorical Analysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. 
MIAMI. L. REV. 979, 979-80 (July 2008).   
31 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).   
32 See Mylius, 201 F. at 863. 
33 See, e.g., In re Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. 503, 513 (BIA 2008) (using categorical 
approach to determine removability for a crime of child abuse pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(E)(i)); In re Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I&N Dec. 330, 334 (BIA 1996) (using 
categorical approach to determine removability for a firearms offense pursuant to former 8 
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i)); In re Alcantar, 20 I&N Dec. 801, 810 (BIA 1994) (using 
categorical approach to determine removability for an aggravated felony pursuant to former 
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii)). 
34 See Dulal-Whiteway v. DHS, 501 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir. 2007). 
35 See Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I&N Dec. at 334. 
36 See In re Milian-Dubon, 25 I&N Dec. 197, 199 (BIA 2010). 
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is also part of the record of conviction.37  Documents such as the police 
report do not form the basis of the facts presented to the jury; this document 
provides one person’s version of the facts leading to the conviction.38  Thus, 
the facts leading up to a conviction – what happened on the street – do not 
matter to an immigration judge.39  Using the categorical approach, the judge 
may only consider the elements of the criminal statute and, if necessary, the 
documents contained in the record of conviction.40   
                                                          
37 See id. (citing Shepard v. U.S., 544 U.S. 13, 16, 26 (2005)). 
38 See In re Teixeira, 21 I&N Dec. 316, 320 (BIA 1996).  This consideration of the record 
of conviction is commonly called the “modified categorical approach.”  See, e.g., Dulal-
Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 122.  For the purposes of this article, I will refer to both the 
categorical and the modified categorical approach collectively as the “categorical 
approach.” 
39 See In re Torres-Varela, 23 I&N Dec. 78, 84 (BIA 2001) (“The crime must be one that 
necessarily involves moral turpitude without consideration of the circumstances under 
which the crime was, in fact, committed.”). 
40 The development of the categorical approach in immigration law has been influenced by 
the categorical approach used in the criminal sentencing context.  See Taylor v. United 
States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990) (determining whether a state burglary conviction was a 
predicate burglary offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e), in order to enhance the defendant’s sentence for being a “career” criminal and 
holding that if the statute of prior conviction was broader than the generic burglary statute, 
the sentencing court only could look to the documents upon which the jury relied to 
convict, such as the charging paper and jury instructions); see also Shepard, 544 U.S. at 19 
(applying Taylor’s reasoning to prior convictions that were based on plea agreements).  
Many of the reasons for the use of the categorical approach in immigration cases track the 
reasons for its use in the criminal sentencing context.  Like the sentencing statute, most of 
the criminal removal grounds are premised on a “conviction.”  See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600; 
Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 125 (reasoning that the use of the word “conviction” in the 
sentencing and removal contexts are analogous and thus the categorical approach as used in 
Taylor is the appropriate approach for criminal removal cases); Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N 
Dec. at 513 (“[W]here a ground of deportability is premised on the existence of a 
‘conviction’…the focus of the immigration authorities must be on the crime of which the 
alien was convicted, to the exclusion of any other criminal or morally reprehensible acts he 
may have committed.”).  In addition, immigration judges, like sentencing judges, do not 
have time to retry a prior conviction.  See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601 (“[T]he practical 
difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach are daunting.”); Pichardo-Sufren, 
24 I&N Dec. at 335; notes 196-99 and accompanying text, infra.  However, unlike the 
criminal sentencing context, the use of the categorical approach in removal proceedings is 
not mandated by the Sixth Amendment, as there is no right to a jury trial in removal 
proceedings.  See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 24 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
490 (2000)) (reasoning that a sentencing judge’s factual inquiry into the underlying offense 
would raise Sixth Amendment concerns, since any fact other than a prior conviction that 
raises the limit of a possible sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, in the absence 
of a defendant’s waiver of such rights); Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2008).  
Also, the burdens of proof do not line up in criminal and removal cases, as in a criminal 
case, the prosecution must prove every element “beyond reasonable doubt,” whereas in a 
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Applying the categorical approach, the judge in Juan’s case will 
look at the statute of conviction, larceny.  The state in which Juan was 
convicted has a broad larceny statute, which punishes some offenses that 
involve moral turpitude (permanent takings) and some that do not 
(temporary takings).41  The judge then looks at the record of conviction, 
which includes the charging document and Juan’s plea agreement.42  If 
these documents do not indicate whether he was convicted for a permanent 
or temporary taking, Juan is not removable, as the burden is on DHS to 
prove removability.43  
 
C. In re Silva-Trevino: The New Moral Turpitude Test 
 
In Silva-Trevino, a 2008 precedent decision, AG Mukasey 
overhauled the categorical approach, creating a new three-part test to 
determine whether an offense is a CIMT.44  In the first step, an immigration 
judge must determine whether there is a “realistic probability, not a 
theoretical possibility,” that the statute under which the noncitizen was 
convicted reaches conduct that does not involve moral turpitude.45  In the 
second step, if the statute is divisible, he instructs judges to use the 
traditional categorical approach, looking to the record of conviction to 
determine whether the offense involved moral turpitude.46  The third step is 
where the AG significantly broke with the traditional categorical approach: 
“[w]hen the record of conviction is inconclusive, judges may, to the extent 
                                                                                                                                                   
removal case, the government must prove every element of a removal ground by “clear and 
convincing evidence.”  See Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2303; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). 
41 See In re D-, 1 I&N Dec. at 144-45. 
42 See Milian-Dubon, 25 I&N Dec. at 199. 
43 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). 
44 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 689-704. 
45 24 I&N Dec. at 690 (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)).  
The AG stated, “Imagination is not…the appropriate standard under the framework set 
forth in this opinion.  Instead, the question is whether there is a ‘realistic probability, not a 
theoretical possibility,’ that the…statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not 
involve moral turpitude.”  Id. at 708.  The “realistic probability” test requires respondents 
to cite actual (not hypothetical) cases in which the relevant criminal statute is applied to 
conduct that does not involve moral turpitude.  See In re Loussaint, 24 I&N Dec. 754, 757 
(BIA 2009) (citing Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 698).  This new approach shifts the 
burden to respondents to produce a case in which non-turpitudinous conduct was actually 
punished by the statute, a task that can be extremely difficult since many criminal statutes 
are enforced through plea agreements that never produce a written decision.  See Nunez v. 
Holder, 594 F.3d 1124,1138 n.10 (9th Cir. 2010); Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 482; Norton 
Tooby and Dan Kesselbrenner, Living With Silva-Trevino, 8-11 (2009), available at 
http://nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources.htm#cdd.  
46 Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 690. 
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they deem necessary and appropriate, consider evidence beyond the formal 
record of conviction.”47   
The AG wrote a detailed opinion describing the reasons for 
overhauling the categorical approach in the CIMT context.48  He first 
pointed to some ambiguity in the INA,49 which would allow the agency to 
command deference in this new analysis.50  The AG next discussed a 
“patchwork” of circuit court decisions on the use of the categorical 
approach; in the name of the uniform application of immigration law, he 
wished to create one approach to the CIMT analysis with his decision in 
Silva-Trevino.51  The AG also concluded that the categorical approach can 
be under-inclusive, since some noncitizens who committed offenses that 
actually involved moral turpitude would be free from removal if they were 
convicted under a broad statute, or over-inclusive, since some courts 
                                                          
47 See id.  Step three of the new CIMT analysis was foreshadowed by two 2007 BIA 
decisions in which the BIA started to reject the categorical approach, allowing judges to 
peer behind the record of conviction and engage in a factual, not categorical, inquiry.  See 
Matter of Gertsenshteyn, 24 I&N Dec. 111, 115-16 (BIA 2007) (creating a bifurcated 
approach for analyzing prostitution aggravated felony offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(K)(ii), which requires judges to use the categorical approach to determine 
whether the offense involves prostitution, but permits judges to use a factual inquiry to 
determine whether the offense was committed for commercial advantage); see also Matter 
of Babaisakov, 24 I&N Dec. 306, 322 (BIA 2007) (applying the bifurcated approach to 
another aggravated felony ground, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), and holding that judges 
should use the categorical approach to determine whether the offense involves fraud, but 
may use a factual inquiry to determine whether the loss to the victim exceeded $10,000).  
In Nijhawan v. Holder, the Supreme Court applied the bifurcated approach for analyzing 
fraud aggravated felony offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i); the Court held that 
judges would use the categorical approach to determine whether the offense involves fraud, 
but may use a factual inquiry to determine the loss to the victim.  See 129 S. Ct. at 2302.   
48 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 688-704. 
49 See id. at 693.  For example, two deportation statutes use the phrase “convicted of” a 
CIMT, which would indicate Congressional preference for the categorical approach; 
however, one inadmissibility statute uses the phrase “committed” a CIMT.  See id. (citing 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii)); see also Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N 
Dec. at 513.  He also highlighted the use of the word “involving” in the phrase “crime 
involving moral turpitude” to indicate a Congressional preference for a factual inquiry.  See 
Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 693 (citing Marciano, 450 F.2d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir. 1971) 
(Eisele, J., dissenting) (“[Congress] said that deportation was the consequence when the 
crime involved moral turpitude, and I can only assume that it meant when moral turpitude 
was in fact involved.”) (emphasis in original).   
50 See National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 
967, 981-82 (2005) (giving Chevron deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation even 
though it conflicts with prior agency and circuit court interpretations).   
51 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 694; note 305, infra. 
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consider the “general nature” of the crime and its classification in “common 
usage.”52    
The AG discussed a major argument in favor of the categorical 
approach, that of administrative efficiency.53  He reasoned that 
“administrative efficiency…is ‘secondary to the determination and 
enforcement of’ statutory language and ‘obvious legislative intent.’”54  He 
disagreed with the BIA’s prior reasoning that permitting inquiry beyond the 
record of conviction would provide “no clear stopping point” to re-litigation 
of past crimes.55  He stated that his new approach is “not an invitation to re-
litigate the conviction itself;”56 however, he provided little guidance to 
judges on how to determine whether an offense involved moral turpitude if 
the statute is divisible.  He merely stated, “a hierarchy of evidence certainly 
may be appropriate to ensure administrative workability and to avoid 
engaging in a retrial of the alien’s prior crime.”57  
Of note was the AG’s decision-making process.  The opinion in 
Silva-Trevino was a result of a “secret process” in which he certified the 
decision to himself without indicating to the parties that he was considering 
overhauling the categorical approach.58  In Mr. Silva-Trevino’s case, the 
                                                          
52 The AG, citing the dissenting opinion in Marciano, highlighted the potential for the 
categorical approach to yield over- or under-inclusive determinations: 
I cannot believe that Congress intended for [persons who have actually committed 
crimes involving moral turpitude] to be allowed to remain simply because there 
might have been no moral turpitude in the commission by other individuals (real 
or hypothetical) of crimes described by the wording of the same statute under an 
identical indictment…[However,] [t]he statute says deportation shall follow when 
the crime committed involves moral turpitude, not when that type of crime 
‘commonly’ or ‘usually’ does.  
Id. at 695 (quoting Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1027-28 (Eisele, J., dissenting)).  
53 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 702; notes 196-99, infra.  The AG also discussed why 
the categorical approach as used in the sentencing context was not a good fit for 
immigration cases.  First, he reasoned that “moral turpitude” is never an element of a 
noncitizen’s prior offense; while it is “simple” for a sentencing court employing the 
categorical approach to search for the necessary elements in the statute of conviction for 
the prior offense, an immigration court never will find “moral turpitude” listed in the 
elements of the statute.  Id. at 700-01.  The AG also reasoned that the Sixth Amendment 
does not apply to removal cases, so the constitutional concern arising in sentencing cases 
does not mandate the categorical approach in immigration cases.  See id. at 701.   
54 Id. at 702 (quoting Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1029 (Eisele, J., dissenting)). 
55 Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 702 (quoting Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I&N Dec. at 336). 
56 Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 703. 
57 See id.  
58 See Memorandum of Law of Amici Curiae American Immigration Lawyers Association 
et al. in Support of Reconsideration 1, 5-6, Order No. 3034-2009, Silva-Trevino, A013-
014-303 (AG Jan. 15, 2009), available at 
http://bibdaily.com/pdfs/Silva%20Trevino%20recon%20denied%201-15-09.pdf    
[hereinafter “Reconsideration Memo”].   
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BIA had decided that his offense was not a CIMT and remanded the case to 
the immigration judge to hold a hearing on relief from removal.59  The 
BIA’s decision did not question established precedent on the categorical 
approach or the standard for determining whether a crime involves moral 
turpitude.60  One year later, Mr. Silva-Trevino’s lawyer was informed by 
the BIA that the Attorney General had certified the case to himself.61  The 
notice did not identify the issues that the Attorney General would consider; 
nor did it define the scope of his review, provide a briefing schedule or 
apprise counsel of the applicable briefing procedure.62  Mr. Silva-Trevino’s 
attorney attempted to inquire about the reason for referral to the Attorney 
General, but received no response.63  Because the certification order was not 
made public, stakeholders – immigrants’ rights organizations, immigration 
judges, ICE and many others – were not given the opportunity to give input 
on this drastic change to immigration law.64   
The Attorney General decided Silva-Trevino on November 7, 2008, 
days after the election results determined that a new administration would 
gain control of the Department of Justice.65  On November 19, 2008, the 
decision was first made public and therefore binding on all future parties.66  
Three days later, Mr. Silva-Trevino’s lawyer received a faxed copy of the 
decision.67  A motion to reconsider, which included a lengthy amicus brief 
signed by several immigrants’ rights organizations, was filed on December 
5, 2008.68  In a one-paragraph order dated January 15, 2009 (two business 
days before the Bush administration left office), AG Mukasey denied the 
motion for reconsideration, stating: 
 
Having reviewed the motion and supporting materials, including 
briefs submitted by various nonprofit organizations as amici curiae, 
I find no basis for reconsideration of the decision.  Among other 
things, this matter was properly certified and decided in accordance 
with settled Department of Justice procedures, and there is no 
                                                          
59 Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 692. 
60 See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 5 (citing BIA Op. dated Aug. 8, 2006). 
61 Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 5.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(i) gives the AG 
authority to review any decision by the BIA.   
62 Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d 462, 471 n.11 (3d Cir. 2010); Reconsideration Memo, supra note 
58, at 1, 5-6. 
63 Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 6. 
64 See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 471 n.11; Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 6. 
65 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 687. 
66 Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 6; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g). 
67 Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 6. 
68 See generally Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58. 
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entitlement to briefing when a matter is certified for Attorney 
General review.69 
 
II. Many Types of Deference 
 
Immigration judges and circuit courts alike now must grapple with 
Silva-Trevino’s new moral turpitude test.  An outstanding question is 
whether the Attorney General’s decision should command deference by 
courts under Chevron.70  This section examines different types of deference 
in administrative law.     
 
A. From Skidmore to Chevron Deference 
 
Soon after the New Deal’s “watershed period in the creation of new 
federal administrative agencies,”71 courts agreed that Congress could 
delegate law-making power to agencies.72  Courts then had to decide who 
should have the final say in matters of statutory interpretation: courts or 
                                                          
69 Order No. 3034-2009, Silva-Trevino, A013-014-303 (AG Jan. 15, 2009), available at 
http://bibdaily.com/pdfs/Silva%20Trevino%20recon%20denied%201-15-09.pdf .   
70 Only one circuit court, the Third Circuit, has examined this question in any detail; this 
decision is discussed in Part IV, infra.  See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d 462.  The Eighth Circuit, 
without significant discussion, refused to apply Silva-Trevino because it conflicted with the 
court’s precedent.  See Guardado-Garcia v. Holder, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16110, at *5-6 
(8th Cir. Aug. 4, 2010).  The Ninth Circuit declined to consider a challenge to the 
retroactive application of the Silva-Trevino framework; the court remanded the case 
because the petitioner’s hearing did not comport with due process.  See Castruita-Gomez v. 
Holder, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18612, at *3-4 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 2010).  The Ninth Circuit 
also is considering another challenge to the Silva-Trevino framework; in both Ninth Circuit 
cases, immigrants’ rights organizations filed amicus briefs highlighting the various 
problems with the AG’s decision.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Immigrant Defense Project et 
al., Castruita-Gomez v. Holder, No. 06-74582 (9th Cir.), available at 
http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/webPages/other.htm [hereinafter Castruita-
Gomez Amicus Brief]; Brief of Amici Curiae Immigrant Defense Project et al., Zamudio-
Ramirez v. Holder, No. 09-71083 (9th Cir.), available at 
http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/webPages/other.htm [hereinafter Zamudio-
Ramirez Amicus Brief].    
71 Jerry L. Mashaw, Richard A. Merrill, Peter M. Shane, Administrative Law: The 
American Public Law System, Cases and Materials 5 (6th ED. 2009). 
72 See Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414, 423-26 (1944) (upholding Congressional delegation of 
authority to set prices during wartime, which was implemented by the Office of Price 
Administration); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 421, 447-48 (1987) (discussing Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935), which invalided the National Industrial Recovery Act as an 
unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking power, and stating: “[t]he constitutional assault 
eventually disintegrated in the face of prolonged and persistent popular support of 
regulatory administration”). 
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agencies.  The Supreme Court decided initially that courts would give a 
light amount of deference to the agency because of its technical expertise in 
the subject matter.73  In Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,74 the Supreme Court in 
1944 described a certain level of deference that was due to agency 
decisions: 
 
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the 
Administrator under this Act [Fair Labor Standards Act], while not 
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute 
a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and 
litigants may properly resort for guidance.  The weight of such a 
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness 
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.75 
 
The Supreme Court thus decided that the agency’s technical expertise and 
manner in which it decided an issue of statutory interpretation gave it 
“power to persuade” a court.76  Over the course of forty years, however, the 
Court changed its opinion on just how persuasive an agency’s interpretation 
was. 
In its 1984 decision Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,77 the Supreme 
Court held that a reviewing court should defer to the agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous term that appears in the statute the agency 
was charged to administer.78  The Court held,  
 
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is 
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a 
specific provision of the statute by regulation.  Such legislative 
                                                          
73 See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 549, 565 (1985) (referring to Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944), as the Court’s 
“courteous regard” for agency decisions). 
74 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
75 Id. at 140. 
76 See id.; see also Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens 
and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13 (1990) (referring to this analysis as “Skidmore 
consideration,” under which “the agency interpretation is a substantial input and counts for 
something…[b]ut the authoritative act of interpretation remains with the court.”). 
77 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
78 Id. at 843-44. 
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regulations are given controlling weight unless they are 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.79  
 
In what is famously known as the Chevron two-step analysis,80 first a 
reviewing court, “employing the traditional tools of statutory 
construction,”81 determines whether the statute is ambiguous.  If the statute 
is clear, the court gives effect to that meaning.82  If the statute is ambiguous, 
the court defers to the agency’s interpretation, so long as it is reasonable.83  
In determining whether a given interpretation is reasonable, “[t]the court 
need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it 
permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the 
reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a 
judicial proceeding.”84   
 The Court justified the rule by reasoning that the agency’s expertise 
surpassed that of a court when the question involved a technically complex 
issue.85  Issues that agencies regulate also involve competing interests from 
several parties; the Court reasoned that Congress may not have desired to 
wade into the fray and preferred to delegate the question to the agency: 
 
Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the [agency] to strike 
the balance at this level, thinking that those with greater 
expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the 
                                                          
79 Id. 
80 See Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 190.  Scholars have debated how many 
steps Chevron has.  See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger and Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two 
Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611 (2009); but see Matthew C. Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule, 
Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009). 
81 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.  Scholars have discussed what the “traditional tools of 
statutory construction” are.  See, e.g., Kenneth Bamberger, Normative Canons in the 
Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 75-78 (2008). 
82 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.   
83 Id. at 844. 
84 Id. at 843 n.11. 
85 Id. at 865.  The leading normative theory for Chevron is that agencies have greater policy 
expertise than courts.  Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2135 (2002).  Professor Cass Sunstein cites this theory’s roots in 
legal realism: “[p]erhaps the two-step inquiry is based on a healthy recognition that in the 
face of ambiguity, agency decisions must rest on judgments of value, and those judgments 
should be made by political rather than judicial institutions.”  Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 
supra note 3, at 197.  However, Professor Elhauge writes that the “the legal realists’ hope 
that legal ambiguities can be resolved by objective policy expertise has long ago grown 
quaint.”  Elhauge, supra note 85, at 2135.  This is because expertise cannot resolve which 
statutory interpetation has the “best” policy implications; also, “in practice, it is rare to find 
a field of social policy where there are no experts on opposing sides of an issue, each 
retained by a rival camp, undermining any claim to an objective expert resolution.”  Id.  
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provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it 
simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps 
Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the 
question, and those on each side decided to take their chances 
with the scheme devised by the agency.86  
 
Chevron greatly expanded the level of deference that a court would 
give to an agency’s interpretation of a statute,87 creating a significant break 
from Skidmore.88  Although praised for the clear line that it drew for courts 
reviewing agency action,89 Chevron left many questions unanswered in 
                                                          
86 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.  Scholars cite the political justifications for the Chevron 
doctrine, explaining why Congress delegates interpretive authority to the agency.  See, e.g., 
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L. J. 549, 566-71 (2009).  Professor 
Bressman describes that under a positive political theory, Congress is composed of 
members who wish to spend time on activities that improve their reelection chances; 
members lack both time and expertise to devote to technically complex issues, so they 
delegate them to agencies.  Id. at 566-67.  Congress never can develop the expertise needed 
and convert that expertise directly into law because it is inefficient to do so, since all 
decisions made by legislative committees must pass through the floor, which works as a 
policy middle-man that can alter legislation.  Id. at 567.  Agencies, on the other hand, are 
not hampered by this process and their rulings can become law directly.  Id.  She cites 
Congress’ desire to “write just enough policy to receive a positive response for its actions, 
while deflecting any negative attention for the burdensome details to the agency.”  Id. at 
568.  In addition, Congress may choose ambiguous words to obtain consensus, since both 
parties can claim a victory and then later influence agency decision-makers to support their 
own legislative agendas when sorting out the details.  Id. at 571.  “By choosing words that 
‘mean all things to all people,’ Congress can obtain the requisite support to enact a bill 
while preserving opportunities to recommence the battle at another time and in another 
place.”  Id. at 571-72 (citing Robert A. Katzmann, The American Legislative Process as a 
Signal, 9 J. PUB. POL’Y 287, 290 (1989)); see also Elhauge, supra note 85, at 2127 
(interpreting Chevron as a default rule that constrains judges to maximize political 
preference satisfaction because “the policy views that govern actions of agency 
heads…generally come about as close to an accurate barometer of current political 
preferences as courts can get.”).   
87 Professor Sunstein states that “shortly after it appeared, Chevron was quickly taken to 
establish a new approach to judicial review of agency interpretations of law, going so far as 
to create a kind of counter-Marbury for the administrative state.”  Sunstein, Chevron Step 
Zero, supra note 3, at 188; cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).   
88 See Merrill and Hickman, supra note 3, at 853-56; see also Christensen v. Harris County, 
529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Skidmore 
deference to authoritative agency views is an anachronism, dating from the era in which we 
declined to give agency interpretations (including interpretive regulations, as opposed to 
‘legislative rules’) authoritative effect…That era came to an end with our watershed 
decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.”). 
89 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
1989 DUKE L. J. 511, 512 (1989). 
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administrative law.90  One such unanswered question was how the agency’s 
use of procedures affects a reviewing court’s deference.   
 
B. Deference Tailored to the Agency’s Procedures 
 
An agency can make a decision through a spectrum of formal and 
informal procedures.91  On one end of the spectrum is notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.92  Courts have interpreted the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in such a way that 
these procedures have “come to resemble an elaborate ‘paper hearing.’”93  
Agencies must provide supporting documentation with the notice of 
proposed rulemaking, respond in detail to all substantial comments and 
proffer a lengthy justification for the final rule, including explanations of 
why it rejected alternatives.94  As one scholar states, “notice-and-comment 
                                                          
90 See Merrill and Hicks, supra note 3, at 840-852 (discussing fourteen questions left 
unresolved by Chevron and four decisions in which Court attempted to answer some of the 
unresolved questions). 
91 Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1449 (2005) [hereinafter Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled] (“All 
procedures are not created equal.”).  Not all agencies have the authority to engage in a 
range of policymaking tools; Congress determines which types of policymaking tools an 
agency can use.  See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1386-90 (2004).   
92 In this article, I refer to informal rulemaking as “notice-and-comment rulemaking” or 
“rulemaking.” Informal rulemaking is governed by 5 U.S.C. § 553.  The term “informal” 
distinguishes this form of rulemaking from formal rulemaking, which requires an oral 
hearing complete with procedural requirements.  Congress directs agencies which form of 
rulemaking to employ; when the statute requires rules to be made “on the record after 
opportunity for an agency hearing,” the agency should engage in formal rulemaking, 
governed by 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556 and 557.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).  Because agencies 
utilize informal rulemaking more often than formal rulemaking, in this article, I discuss 
informal rulemaking as the one end of the “process” spectrum.  See Mashaw, Merrill, and 
Shane, Administrative Law: The American Public Law System, Cases and Materials, supra 
note 71, at 507-10 (discussing statutes that require formal rulemaking, many of which were 
enacted prior to the APA); see also id. at 509-10 (discussing cases in which agencies 
abandoned formal rulemaking because it made implementation of a new policy “virtually 
impossible”). 
93 Matthew S. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, 
Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 528, 553 (2006); Magill, supra note 91, at 1390 (“[T]oday, promulgating a 
legislative rule is a labor-intensive enterprise.  While there are many reasons for this, it is 
unquestionably due in part to judicially imposed requirements that an agency must follow 
if it expects to survive a challenge to its action in court....”). 
94 See Stephenson, supra note 93, at 553-554 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); La. Fed. Land Bank Ass’n v. Farm 
Credit Admin., 336 F.3d 1075, 1080-81 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Conn. Light & Power Co. v. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 525, 530-32 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
17                                        THE NEW MORAL TURPITUDE TEST 
 
 
 
rulemaking fosters logical and thorough consideration of policy…[and] 
promotes predictability…[a]t a minimum, it allows affected parties, who 
participate in the formulation of a rule, to anticipate the rule and plan 
accordingly.”95   
Adjudications fall somewhere in the middle of this spectrum.96  
They provide important procedural protections to individual litigants, as 
they result from a detailed trial-like gathering of evidence by the agency.97  
While normally binding only on the parties to that proceeding, many orders 
operate as precedent, which will bind future parties.98  As compared to 
rulemaking, adjudications as policymaking tools for agencies do not 
provide opportunity for input to the same extent because they involve only a 
limited class of persons.99  Adjudications also may not be able to issue 
broad pronouncements in the same way as rulemaking because they are 
tailored to the facts of an individual litigant’s case, which may lead to bad 
facts making bad law.100    Additionally, adjudications create retroactive 
                                                          
95 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N. Y. U. L. REV. 461, 542 (2003) [hereinafter Bressman, Beyond 
Accountability]. 
96 See id. at 542. 
97 See Magill, supra note 91, at 1391.  There are two types of adjudications, formal and 
informal.  Formal adjudications, which are governed by 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557, are 
mandated when the statute requires a hearing to be “on the record after an opportunity for 
an agency hearing.”  These are trial-type procedures, which include requirements that the 
parties be given notice of the “matters of facts and law asserted,” § 554(b)(3), an 
opportunity for “the submission and consideration of facts [and] arguments, § 554(c)(1), 
and an opportunity to submit “proposed findings and conclusions” or “exceptions,” § 
557(c)(1), (2).  Information adjudications, the basic requirements of which are set forth in 5 
U.S.C. § 555, do not mandate such procedures.  See 5 U.S.C. §  555. 
98 See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 95, at 542 (noting that the National 
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) frequently uses adjudication as a policymaking tool); 
Magill, supra note 91, at 1394, 1385 (noting that the NLRB and the Federal Trade 
Commission largely make policy by adjudicating individual cases, whereas the Federal 
Communications Commission does so by promulgating legislative rules); see also Charles 
H. Koch Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV. 693, 695 
(2005) (“Even though most agencies possess general policymaking processes, 
administrative adjudications remain a critical part of administrative policymaking.”).  
99 See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 95, at 542; Magill, supra note 91 at 
1391, 1396.  In his dissenting opinion in Wyman-Gordon, Justice Douglas praised the value 
of rulemaking procedures for its facilitation of input from the public: 
Agencies discover that they are not always the repositories of ultimate wisdom; 
they learn from the suggestions of outsiders and often benefit from that 
advice…Public airing of problems through rulemaking makes the bureaucracy 
more responsive to public needs and is an important brake on the growth of 
absolutism in the regime that now governs us all. 
Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 777-78 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
100 See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 95, at 542; Magill, supra note 91, at 
1396. 
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rules because the agency applies the new policy to the individual whose 
case is before it.101   
On the other end of the spectrum are procedures such as guidance 
documents, policy statements and interpretive rules.102  This guidance can 
appear in manuals used by agency personnel, private letter rulings, advice 
given over the phone and public notices such as press releases or 
congressional testimony.103  While these procedures assure virtually no 
public input or deliberation and do not have binding effect, they are less 
costly and more efficient for an agency.104  Which procedure should an 
agency choose to make policy?105  How does the choice of procedures 
interface with the Chevron doctrine?   
In United States v. Mead Corporation,106 the Supreme Court in 2001 
held that an agency’s choice of procedures affect whether that decision will 
command Chevron deference.  The Court examined a Customs Service’s 
                                                          
101 See id.; but see Magill, supra note 91 at 1435 (noting examples in which courts required 
the NLRB to apply a new policy announced in adjudication prospectively only).   
102 Interpretive rules explain a statute or regulation; they are interpretations of already-
existing legal norms and therefore do not have legal effects on private parties.  See Magill, 
supra note 91, at 1386, 1412. 
103 Id. at 1391.  Professor Magill states the purposes for such guidance: 
Some of these instruments are designed to control the discretion of the agency’s 
front-line bureaucrats, some to advise regulated parties how to comply with 
regulatory requirements or how the agency will exercise its enforcement 
discretion, and others to advance the agency’s position about its authority with 
respect to a one-time but important controversy. 
Id. at 1391-92. 
104 See id.   
105 The Supreme Court has held that an agency has great freedom to decide whether to use 
rulemaking or adjudication to decide policy.  See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 
(1947) (“Chenery II”); see also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) 
(plurality opinion) (refusing to compel agency to establish law through rulemaking process 
before applying it in adjudication); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) 
(holding that a reviewing court only will examine the agency’s choice of procedures under 
the “abuse of discretion” standard).  The Supreme Court in Chenery II stated: “to insist 
upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.”   
Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202.  However, the Court expressed a preference for rulemaking: 
“[t]he function of filling in the interstices of the [statute] should be performed, as much as 
possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.”  
See id.  The Court recognized that adjudication often may be necessary to set policy:  
[P]roblems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not 
reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a 
relevant general rule.  Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience with 
a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and 
fast rule.  Or the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be 
impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule. 
Id. at 202-203. 
106 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
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tariff ruling letter, which set tariff classifications for particular imports.107  
The ruling letters represented the official position of the Customs Service 
with respect to the particular transaction, yet were subject to modification or 
revocation without notice to any person other than the person to whom the 
letter was addressed.108  The regulations governing such letters provided 
that they were binding only on the party to that transaction; “no other 
person should rely on the ruling letter or assume that the principles of that 
ruling will be applied in connection with any transaction other than the one 
described in the letter.”109  The ruling letters were not subject to notice and 
comment before being issued and generally could be modified without 
notice and comment.110  They did not need to be published; they needed 
only to be made “available for public inspection.”111  Any of the forty-six 
port of entry Customs offices or the Customs Headquarters Office could 
issue such ruling letters.112  Additionally, most ruling letters contained little 
or no reasoning, although the letter at issue in the case set out its rationale in 
some detail.113 
The Court held that such ruling letters were not due Chevron 
deference because of the manner in which the letters were written.  The 
Court held, 
 
We hold that administrative implementation of a particular statutory 
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming 
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.  
Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as 
by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-
comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable 
congressional intent.114 
 
The Court reasoned that Congress can explicitly or implicitly delegate 
legislative power to an agency to fill in the details of a statutory 
ambiguity,115 and that a “very good indicator or delegation meriting 
Chevron treatment” is express authorization to engage in the process of 
                                                          
107 See id. at 222. 
108 Id. at 222-23 (citing 19 C.F.R. §§ 177.9(a) and (c)).  
109 Id. at 223 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(c)). 
110 Id. at 223 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 1625(a) and 177.10(c)). 
111 Id. at 223 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1625(a)). 
112 Id. at 224 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 177.11(a)). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 226-27. 
115 Id. at 229. 
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rulemaking or adjudication.116  The Court held, “[i]t is fair to assume 
generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect 
of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure 
tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a 
pronouncement of such force.”117  The Court noted that the overwhelming 
majority of cases applying Chevron deference involved the review of the 
fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, yet 
acknowledged that it sometimes accorded Chevron deference to agency 
decisions without such administrative formality.118 
 The Court held that because the tariff ruling letters were “best 
treated like ‘interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, 
and enforcement guidelines,’”119 they were not due Chevron deference.120  
The Court did not, however, entirely disregard the agency’s interpretation 
and conduct a de novo review of the legal question.  Rather, the Court 
reverted to its pre-Chevron level of deference under Skidmore, which gave 
some, but not automatic, deference to an agency’s decision.121  The Court 
recognized the myriad of administrative statutes and reasoned that there is 
more than one variety of judicial deference.122  The Court thus remanded 
the case for consideration of whether the agency’s decision was due some 
deference because of its specialized knowledge.123 
                                                          
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 230. 
118 Id. at 230-31. 
119 Id. at 234 (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 234; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. 
122 Mead, 533 U.S. at 236.   
123 Id. at 235, 239.  Mead was not the first time the Court opined about the level of Chevron 
deference to be given to administrative procedures that were less formal than notice-and-
comment rulemaking.  In Christensen, the Court considered whether the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”) prohibited a State or subdivision thereof from compelling 
employees to utilize accrued compensatory time in lieu of paying it out to the employees.  
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 580-81.  The county had written to the U.S. Department of 
Labor’s Wage and Hour Division, who wrote an opinion letter interpreting the FLSA and 
regulations to preclude the county from compelling such use of compensatory time.  Id.  
The Court rejected the petitioners’ claim that the county violated the FLSA, reasoning that 
the petitioners’ reading of the statute, the reading shared by the Department of Labor in its 
opinion letter, was “backwards.”  Id. at 588.  In its discussion of whether the Department of 
Labor’s opinion letter merited Chevron deference, the Court stated,  
Here, however, we confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not 
one arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.  Interpretations such as those in opinion letters – like interpretations 
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all 
of which lack the force of law – do not warrant Chevron-style deference…Instead, 
interpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters are ‘entitled to respect’ 
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The Supreme Court in Mead did not set a hard-and-fast rule that 
only agency interpretations resulting from formal notice-and-comment 
rulemaking deserved Chevron deference.124  This failure to set a clear rule is 
one of scholars’ criticisms of the decision.125  Mead has been both praised 
and disparaged; its meaning has been the topic of much scholarship 
following the decision.  
 
C. Exploring Chevron Step Zero 
 
 Scholars and courts alike have pondered the meaning of the Mead126 
and particularly, the threshold question of “Chevron Step Zero – the initial 
                                                                                                                                                   
under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., but only to the extent that those 
interpretations have the “power to persuade.” 
Id. at 587 (quoting Skidmore, 529 U.S. at 140).     
124 Two years after the Mead decision, the Court rejected an argument that only agency 
interpretations resulting from notice-and-comment rulemaking merited Chevron deference.  
See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).  In Barnhart, at issue was the Social Security 
Administration’s interpretation of “disability.”  Id. at 214.  The agency had recently, 
“perhaps in response to this litigation,” promulgated regulations to answer the question at 
issue in the case.  The Court deferred to the agency’s reasonable interpretation, partly 
because it was issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking, but also because it was a 
long-standing interpretation, which the agency had previously expressed through less 
formal procedures.  Id. at 221.  The Court stated, “the fact that the Agency previously 
reached its interpretation through means less formal than ‘notice and comment’ 
rulemaking…does not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial deference 
otherwise its due.”  Id.    
125 See, e.g., Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 91, at 1475; Sunstein, 
Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 193.  Several scholars argue that the Court “wanted to 
regain the interpretive power that courts lost to Chevron by increasing the hurdles that 
agencies face under Chevron.”  Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 91 
Judicial Review of Agency Action, at 1482.  In this sense, Mead is seen as a power grab by 
courts.  See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference? Implied Delegations, Agency 
Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skimore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 751 (2002) 
(arguing that Mead “represents a naked power grab by courts”); David J. Barron and Elena 
Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 225 (2001) 
(hypothesizing that the Mead Court’s rhetoric about congressional intent may be to “cloak 
judicial aggrandizement”); see also Elhauge, supra note 85, at 2157 n.462 (discussing 
assumption that judges intend to maximize their own statutory preferences).       
126 See, e.g., Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 91, at 1475; Sunstein, 
Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 193 (criticizing Mead’s “force of law” test as “a crude 
way of determining whether Chevron deference is appropriate”); Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 
807, 833 (2002) (“[Mead] comes up short in terms of articulating a meta-rule to guide 
lower courts in future controversies.”); see also Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., 316 F.3d 913, 921 (9th Cir. 2003) (“After Mead, we are certain of only two things 
about the continuum of deference owed to agency decisions: Chevron provides an example 
of when Chevron applies, and Mead provides an example of when it does not.”).   
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inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all.”127  The Mead 
Court left undefined what it means for an agency decision to have the “force 
of law.”128  Professor Thomas Merrill identifies three factors relevant to 
whether a decision has the force of law: “(1) whether Congress has 
prescribed relatively formal procedures; (2) whether Congress has 
authorized the agency to adopt rules or precedents that generalize to more 
than a single case; and (3) whether Congress has authorized the agency to 
prescribe legal norms that apply uniformly throughout its jurisdiction.”129  
Accordingly, the scholarship divides into three primary justifications for 
Mead: (1) the importance of procedures; (2) the importance of binding 
effect; and (3) the importance of authoritativeness.          
Several scholars have discussed the importance of procedural 
formality to Mead’s “force of law” test.  Professor Cass Sunstein reads 
Mead as “motivated by a concern that Chevron deference would ensure an 
insufficient safeguard against agency decisions not preceded by formal 
procedures.”130  By awarding Chevron deference to agency decisions 
reached through formal procedures, Mead “attempt[s] to carry forward a 
central theme in administrative law: developing surrogate safeguards for the 
protections in the Constitution itself.”131  Formal procedures promote 
“‘fairness and deliberation’ by, for example, giving people an opportunity 
to be heard and offering reasoned responses to what people have to say,”132 
whereas “informal processes…are unlikely to promote values of 
                                                          
127 Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 191 (attributing the term “Chevron Step 
Zero” to Merrill and Hickman, supra note 3, at 836).  In his article Chevron Step Zero, 
Professor Sunstein discusses the force of law holding in Mead and the related cases of 
Barnhart and Christensen.  See id. at 211-31 (citing Barnhart, 535 U.S. 212 and 
Christensen, 529 U.S. 576).  He also discusses a separate Step Zero trilogy involving 
Chevron deference when the agency is deciding interstitial or major questions.  See id. at 
231-47 (discussing MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994), 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995), 
and FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)).   
128 See Merrill, supra note 126, at 813 (stating that the Mead Court did not identify the 
triggering conditions for determining when an agency has been given the power to act with 
the force of law). 
129 Id.  Professor Merrill discussed a possible a fourth factor, “whether the agency had 
sought to exercise such authority,” which he discounted because the Mead Court collapsed 
this inquiry with the question of whether Congress authorized the agency to act with 
authority.  Id. at 814 n.41.  He also discussed a fifth factor, “whether Congress has 
provided for de novo review of the agency action that incorporates the interpretation,” 
which he discounted because the Court held in U.S. v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 
394 (1999), that an agency’s regulation merits Chevron deference notwithstanding a 
statutory provision of de novo review by a court.  Id.  
130 Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 227. 
131 Id. at 225.   
132 Id. at 225 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 230). 
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participation and deliberation.”133  Professors Thomas Merrill and Kristin 
Hickman write that the “correspondence between the delegation to act with 
the force of law and the existence of rights of public participation is not 
accidental”134 because “[g]eneral norms of democratic governance and 
traditions of due process both stress the importance of affording affected 
persons the right to be heard before they are subjected to the coercive power 
of the state.”135   
Scholars argue that Mead allows agencies to engage in a cost-benefit 
analysis, weighing the cost of formal procedures, which command 
deference, against the more efficient and inexpensive informal rulings, 
which risk being overruled by a reviewing court.136  Professor Matthew 
Stephenson interprets the rationale in Mead to have arisen “because courts 
tend to view formal process as a proxy for variables that the court considers 
important but cannot observe directly, such as the significance of the issue 
to the agency’s mission or the degree to which the agency’s judgment 
                                                          
133 Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 225; see also Barron and Kagan, supra 
note 125, at 234 (“the [Mead] Court’s focus appears to follow from the view that deference 
should depend on whether agency action has a connection to the public and whether that 
action results from disciplined consideration.”).   
134 Merrill and Hickman, supra note 3, at 886.  While Professors Merrill and Hickman were 
not writing in response to the Mead decision, as it had not yet been published, they 
discussed the “force of law” holding in Christensen in their article Chevron’s Domain.  See 
id. at 882-88 (citing Christensen, 529 U.S. at 576). 
135 See id. at 886. 
136 See Stephenson, supra note 93, at 547-48 (“The very costliness of formal procedures 
provides [a reviewing] court with valuable information about how important the 
interpretive question at issue is to the agency’s policy agenda.”); Sunstein, Chevron Step 
Zero, supra note 3, at 225-26 (“Mead puts agencies to a salutary choice; it essentially says, 
‘Pay me now or pay me later.’  Under Mead, agencies may proceed expeditiously and 
informally, in which case they can invoke Skidmore but not Chevron, or they may act more 
formally, in which case Chevron applies.”); Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 
95, at 539 (“The law-like decisionmaking requirement…ensure(s) that agencies put their 
money where their mouths are.”); Merrill, supra note 126, at 822 (“It is now clear, agencies 
must make a certain investment in administrative processes to obtain the Chevron payoff.  
In the vocabulary of Christensen and Mead, agencies must take whatever procedural steps 
are necessary to assure that their interpretation has the ‘force of law.’”); Merrill and Hicks, 
supra note 3, at 887 (“If an agency is willing to treat an interpretation as legally binding, 
and in so doing to subject itself to the procedural requirements associated with action that 
is legally binding, then the agency would be ‘rewarded’ by having its interpretation given 
mandatory deference by the courts.”); E. Donald Elliot, Reinventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE 
L. J. 1490, 1492 (1992) (“As in the television commercial in which the automobile 
repairman intones ominously ‘pay me now, or pay me later,’ the agency has a choice: It can 
go through the procedural effort of making a legislative rule now and avoid the burdens of 
case-by-case justification down the road, or it can avoid the hassle of rulemaking now, but 
at the price of having to engage in more extensive, case-by-case justification down the 
road.”).   
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reflects a sensible balancing of the relevant considerations.”137   Thus, 
agencies that want to advocate a more aggressive reading of a statute “must 
decide whether it is worth paying the costs associated with formal 
procedures in order to ‘purchase’ greater judicial toleration of a more 
aggressive interpretation of the statute.”138  He argues that Mead increases 
an agency’s incentive to use more formal procedures if the agency desires 
an aggressive reading of a statute; agency interpretations made through less 
formal procedures must be more textually plausible in order to command 
Chevron deference.139  Because Mead allows only formal procedures to 
invoke Chevron deference, whereas informal procedures receive the less 
deferential Skidmore review, “the legal system as a whole will provide an 
ample check on agency discretion and the risk that it will be exercised 
arbitrarily – in one case, through relatively formal procedures and in 
another, through relatively careful judicial check on agency interpretations 
of law.”140   
Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman interprets Mead through a positive 
political theory lens:141 as an important tool in the Congressional oversight 
of agencies.142  She cites two theories of monitoring mechanisms: “police 
patrols,” which are direct forms of oversight such as committee hearings,143 
and “fire alarms,” which enlist private parties to gather information and 
notify Congress of proposed changes to regulatory policy.144  Congress can 
use administrative procedures to place constituents into the administrative 
process, where they may alert members of Congress to agency action that 
                                                          
137 Stephenson, supra note 93, at 530-31.  “The court may, for example, believe that 
procedural formality facilitates the accurate evaluation of complex issues, promotes 
reasoned deliberation, or prevents special-interest capture.”  Id. at 547-48.  He writes, 
“although procedural formality and textual plausibility increase the agency’s odds of 
surviving judicial review, they are also both costly to the agency.”  Id. at 531.   
138 Id. at 531; but see Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 
54 ADMIN. L. REV. 771, 796-97 (2002) (reasoning that agencies rarely consider the 
standard of review when deciding which formal to follow). 
139 Stephenson, supra note 93, at 534. 
140 See Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 226.        
141 Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 86, at 567 (citing David Epstein & Sharyn 
O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political 
Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 961 (1998)).  Positive political theory is 
described in more detail at note 86, supra.   
142 Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 86, at 580.  Professor Bressman notes that the 
while Mead values procedures, which are a mechanism to facilitate legislative monitoring, 
Mead “botches the implementation” because it links procedures to rule-of-law values, as 
opposed to legislative monitoring.  Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 86, at 580.   
143 Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 86, at 570 (citing Mathew D. McCubbins and 
Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire 
Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984)). 
144 Id. 
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will change the status quo before the action is final.145  The procedures thus 
shift monitoring costs from Congress to its constituents.146  Mead, which 
requires agencies to use such procedures, ensures that Congress maintains 
proper oversight over agency action.147  Critical to this analysis is where to 
strike the balance – agencies need only use procedures that provide enough 
information to constituents to facilitate fire alarm oversight; any additional 
procedures merely add cost without providing more information.148 
Critics reason that the Court’s holding in Mead requires too many 
procedures, which consume agency time and resources; the result is an 
ossification of administrative law.149  The most formal of procedures 
commonly used by agencies, notice-and-comment rulemaking, “both 
symboliz[es] and amplif[ies] all that the public finds most distasteful in 
government.”150  However, “the Constitution strikes a balance between 
efficiency and procedural formality, committing us to a certain degree, 
perhaps a large degree, of inefficiency.  As the onerous requirements of the 
legislative process attest, efficiency often yields to procedural formality and 
                                                          
145 Id. 
146 Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 86, at 570. 
147 See id.; see also Elhauge, supra note 85, at 2145 (discussing the Mead case and stating, 
“the reason the doctrine depends not just on how much power the agency was granted, but 
on how the agency exercises its power, is that only certain methods of exercise provide the 
reasonable assurance that the agency action reflects current governmental preferences.”).  
Professor Bressman interprets the case of Barnhart through the lens of informational 
oversight by Congress.  In Barnhart, the Court gave deference to the agency, not because 
of the procedures used, but for a number of other reasons, one of which was the 
longstanding nature of the agency’s position.  Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 
86, at 583 (citing Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222).  This is another way that Congress ensures 
that the agency reflects congressional preferences, because Congress can rely on positions 
that the agency has maintained before or during the course of legislative drafting.  
Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 86, at 583.      
148 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1749, 1785 (2007) [hereinafter Bressman, Procedures as Politics].   
149 See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s 
opinion would ossify statutory law because the agency’s flexibility to interpret the law in a 
new way would cease upon the first judicial resolution of the question); Barron and Kagan, 
supra note 125, at 230-31 (“These procedures consume significant agency time and 
resources and thereby inhibit needed regulatory (or, for that matter, deregulatory) 
initiatives.  Mead inevitably will channel additional agency action into this already 
overburdened administrative mechanism, as agencies sometimes adopt notice-and-
comment procedures for no other reason than to gain Chevron deference.”); see also 
Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE 
L. J. 1385 (1992); but see Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 148, at 1819-20, n. 
381 and 382 (discussing empirical studies that have shown administrative procedures do 
not ossify practice).   
150 Barron and Kagan, supra note 125, at 232. 
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the values it secures.”151  Also, the Mead Court did not require agencies to 
use the most formal procedures to command Chevron deference;152 standard 
procedures such as notice-and-comment rulemaking and adjudication are 
mere examples of the types of procedures that are acceptable to guarantee 
Chevron deference.153  Professor Bressman states, “unmitigated formalism 
is neither necessary or wise…We instead should afford Congress or 
agencies a little leeway to create administrative lawmaking procedures 
beyond trial-type or paper hearing but require that those procedures adhere 
to certain specified limits – in particular, that the resulting policy is 
transparent, rational, and binding.”154   
Scholars also have emphasized the importance of binding effect to 
the Mead holding.  Professor Ronald Levin argues that the Mead inquiry 
should turn not on what procedures were used, but whether the agency 
action is binding, i.e., it “alters or determines legal rights or obligations.”155  
Professor Sunstein writes that the Mead inquiry can turn on either the 
formality of the agency’s procedures or the binding effect of the agency’s 
decision.156  Professor Bressman also writes that both binding effect and 
procedural formalities were important to the Court’s holding in Mead.157  
She describes “binding effect” as “immediate and irrevocable until 
officially renounced;”158 thus, “[b]inding effect is the promise of consistent 
application.”159  She views Mead as an application of the constitutional 
requirements for lawmaking – careful consideration, transparency and 
consistent application – to agency action.160  In this sense, Mead’s “law-like 
decisionmaking requirement” ensures that agencies exercise their 
policymaking authority “in ways that generally promote consistency and 
specifically prevent ad hoc departures at the behest of narrow interests.”161 
                                                          
151 Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 91, at 1490-91. 
152 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. 
153 Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 91, at 1450. 
154 Id. 
155 See Levin, supra note 138, at 775; see also id. at 794-96 (arguing that Mead’s 
requirement of procedures to guarantee Chevron deference was unnecessary because the 
administrative requirements of finality and ripeness already require an agency to carefully 
consider the implications of its positions).   
156 Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 222 (defining an agency decision that has 
the “force of law” as one that is “binding on private parties in the sense that those who act 
in violation of the decision face immediate sanctions…[and] if the agency is legally bound 
by it as well”). 
157 Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 91, at 1488-89. 
158 Id. at 1489. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 1479-80.   
161 Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 95, at 539; see also id. (“By announcing a 
rule that binds all similarly situated parties, agencies may stem requests for deviations 
except through official channels.”). 
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Professor Robert Anthony, an original proponent of the position the 
Court eventually adopted in Mead,162 argues that an agency’s decision 
should not have the “force of law,” or binding effect, unless the agency has 
used formal procedures.163  He defines an agency decision with “binding 
effect” as one that “is to be applied rigidly to private persons without first 
affording them a realistic chance to challenge its policy,”164 whereas if the 
agency “is open to reconsideration of the policy, the document shows 
neither the intent to bind nor such an effect.”165  He defends his position by 
citing the values of fairness, transparency and deliberation inherent in the 
rulemaking process:  
 
Values served by the legislative rulemaking process are large ones.  
Fairness is furthered by giving notice to those who are to be bound, 
both when the proposed rule is about to be considered and when the 
final rule is definitively published.  The accuracy and thoroughness 
of an agency’s actions are enhanced by the requirement that it invite 
and consider the comments of all the world, including those of 
directly affected persons who are able, often uniquely, to supply 
pertinent information and analysis.  The acceptability and therefore 
the effectiveness of a final rule are elevated by the openness of the 
procedures through which it has been deliberated by the public’s 
sense of useful participation in a process that affects them.  Its 
legitimacy rests upon all of these considerations, as well as upon the 
foundational fact that the agency has observed the procedures laid 
down by Congress for establishing rules with the binding force of 
law.166 
 
Scholars also have discussed the importance of an agency decision’s 
authoritativeness to the Mead analysis.  By this reasoning, the procedures 
used by the agency are of little importance to the Chevron deference 
                                                          
162 See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and 
Courts?, supra note 76. 
163 See id. at 4; see also Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, 
Guidances, Manuals, and the Like – Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the 
Public?, 41 DUKE L. J. 1311, 1314-15 (1992) [hereinafter Anthony, Interpretive Rules]. 
164 Anthony, Interpretive Rules, supra note 163, at 1330. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 1373; see also Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency 
Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 409 (citing as a benefit of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking that the agency receives useful information from previously unknown sources 
and its decision is subject to the discipline of having to respond to these comments); 
Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L. J. 
381, 403 (1985) (“[A]n agency may receive more cooperation and less obstruction from 
regulated interests that have a hand in shaping the rules within which they must function.”). 
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question.  As stated by Professor Sunstein, “if policymaking expertise and 
democratic accountability are relevant, then perhaps Congress should be 
understood to have delegated law-interpreting power whether or not formal 
procedures are involved.” 167  Professor Sunstein suggests that the formality 
of the procedures used may not be the sole reason that the Mead Court 
refused to give the tariff ruling letters Chevron deference.  Rather, the Court 
emphasized the number of such letters produced every year; in this way, 
“Mead emerges as a highly pragmatic case resting on the evident problems 
with deferring to the numerous lower-level functionaries who produce mere 
letter rulings.”168   
Professor David Barron and now Justice Elena Kagan argue that 
Chevron deference should depend on who is making the decision within the 
agency, not how the decision is made.169  They agree with the Mead Court 
that “deference should depend on whether agency action has a connection to 
the public and whether that action results from disciplined 
consideration.”170  However, they argue that those values – connection to 
the public (namely, accountability) and discipline – can be served by courts 
giving Chevron deference only to decisions made by the head of the 
agency.171  They discuss what a statutory delegate – the officer to whom the 
agency’s organic statute has granted authority over a given administrative 
action – must do in order for her decision to get Chevron deference.172  The 
agency’s decision must bear the delegatee’s name, the delegatee must give a 
meaningful review to the decision, and she must adopt the decision as her 
own prior to the final issuance of the decision.173  Barron and Kagan argue, 
“by offering an incentive for certain actors to take responsibility for 
interpretive choice, the principle advances both accountability and 
discipline in decision making.”174  A standard that conditions Chevron 
deference on the decision-making structure, but more particularly, the 
                                                          
167 Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 227; see also Levin, supra note 138, at 
794 (criticizing Mead for its inconsistency with the policy reasons for Chevron, including 
the agency’s expertise, political accountability and capacity to maintain national uniformity 
of a program).  
168 Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 230-31.   
169 Barron and Kagan, supra note 125, at 204; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 258 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (reasoning that Chevron deference should turn on whether the agency’s 
decision was authoritative); Christensen, 529 U.S. at 591, n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
170 Barron and Kagan, supra note 125, at 234. 
171 Id. at 234-57.  They reason that the majority in Mead could have reached the same result 
based on the extreme decentralization of the decision-making in the case.  See id. at 257-
58.   
172 Id. at 237-40.   
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 204.   
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involvement of high-level agency officials in the decision-making, “will 
encourage high-level officials to assume full and visible responsibility for 
interpretive rulings, while ensuring that meaningful review lies behind these 
public acclamations.”175   
 
III. Examining Silva-Trevino at Chevron Step Zero 
 
When considering whether Silva-Trevino deserves Chevron 
deference, courts first should consider the question at Chevron Step Zero – 
the question of whether the Chevron framework applies at all.176  In this 
section, I examine the Attorney General’s decision in Silva-Trevino under 
Mead.  I focus on the importance of procedures to the Mead holding.  I 
argue that Silva-Trevino should not command Chevron deference because, 
while Congress provided the Department of Justice with authority to use 
relatively formal procedures,177 the agency chose the least participatory 
form of policymaking.  In addition, I examine how the agency’s choice of 
adjudication over rulemaking to announce the new moral turpitude test 
impacts the Chevron step zero question.  Finally, I explore whether the 
Silva-Trevino decision’s binding effect and authoritativeness will lead 
courts to conclude that the Chevron framework applies.   
 
A. The Secretive Process: Fostering Neither Fairness                  
Nor Deliberation 
 
Was the AG’s decision in Silva-Trevino an administrative procedure 
that “foster[s] the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a 
pronouncement of such force?”178  As stated recently by the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals, “[t]he unusual circumstances of Silva-Trevino’s referral 
to, and adjudication by, the Attorney General bear mention.”179  The AG’s 
opinion was a result of a “secret process” in which he certified the decision 
to himself without indicating to the parties that he was considering 
overhauling the categorical approach.180  When the AG certified Mr. Silva-
                                                          
175 Id. at 256. 
176 See Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 191. 
177 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (“The Attorney General shall establish such regulations, 
prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other papers, issue such instructions, 
review such administrative determinations in immigration proceedings, delegate such 
authority, and perform such other acts as the Attorney General deems to be necessary for 
carrying out this section.”). 
178 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.   
179 Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 471 n.11. 
180 Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 1, 5-6.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(i) gives the 
Attorney General authority to review any decision by the BIA.  One issue, which is outside 
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Trevino’s case to himself, neither Mr. Silva-Trevino nor his lawyer received 
notice of the issues that the AG would consider; nor were they provided 
with a briefing schedule (albeit fruitless without knowledge of the issues to 
be considered).181  Attempts by Mr. Silva-Trevino’s attorney to inquire 
about the reason for referral to the AG were unanswered.182  Because the 
certification order was not made public, stakeholders were not given the 
opportunity to give input on this drastic change to immigration law until 
after the decision was public and therefore binding on all future parties.183  
A motion to reconsider, which included a lengthy amicus brief signed by 
several immigrants’ rights organizations, was promptly rejected in a one-
paragraph decision.184  Thus, Silva-Trevino suddenly altered over a century 
of immigration law without input from either members of the public or the 
affected party himself. 
In deciding Silva-Trevino, the agency did not employ the tools at its 
disposal, i.e., formal procedures, that provide surrogate safeguards for the 
protections of the Constitution.185  Formal procedures protect the 
constitutional right to due process of law, which guarantees persons a right 
to be heard before they are subjected to the coercive power of the state.186  
In addition, formal procedures maintain constitutional checks and balances 
among the three branches of government by ensuring transparency, which 
prevents problems in the lawmaking process such as faction (agency 
capture by well-organized interest groups) and government self-interest 
(government actors pursuing their own self-interest to the public 
detriment).187  Formal procedures allow affected parties to detect improper 
motives by government actors or expose agency capture by a well-
                                                                                                                                                   
of the scope of this article, is whether the regulation permitting the AG to certify BIA 
decisions to himself is ultra vires.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A) states that removal orders 
become final upon affirmation by the BIA or expiration of the period in which the 
respondent may seek review.  The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(i), which predated 
section 1101(a)(47)(A), gives authority to the Attorney General to alter the BIA’s decision, 
notwithstanding the statute’s directive that such a BIA decision should be final.  Thus, the 
regulation is inconsistent with the statute and thus is arguably invalid.  See William v. 
Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 334 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that a regulation that prohibits the 
filing of a motion to reopen from outside the U.S. is inconsistent with the statute, which 
allows one motion to reopen, and therefore the regulation lacks authority and is invalid).  
181 See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 471 n.11; Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 1, 5-6. 
182 Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 6. 
183 Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 471 n.11; Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 6. 
184 See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58; Silva-Trevino Order, supra note 69. 
185 See Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 225.   
186 See Merrill and Hicks, supra note 3, at 886.   
187 See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 95, at 496-98); Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, supra note 72, at 450.   
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organized interest group, and thus assign blame to the appropriate agency 
actors.188     
In Silva-Trevino, the Attorney General made a pronouncement of 
great force189 through a process that did not embody important 
constitutional requirement for lawmaking, namely, transparency and careful 
consideration.190  No member of the public had any idea that the agency 
was considering a complete overhaul of the categorical approach before the 
decision was published.191  Any deliberation that occurred behind the scenes 
of the AG’s decision likely was one-sided, as opponents of the new policy 
were not given a voice in the discussion.192  This type of deliberation hardly 
exudes transparency, as no member of the public knows what type of 
discussion took place behind closed doors.193  Lacking transparency, the 
decision-making process in Silva-Trevino did not allow affected parties to 
detect improper motives by government actors and assign blame.194  
Therefore, the AG’s decision was not “subject to the political control and 
public scrutiny we demand for agencies as compensation for their lack of 
direct accountability.”195 
                                                          
188 See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 95, at 506. 
189 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230; see also Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 688 (“The Board of 
Immigration Appeals and the Federal courts have long struggled in administering and 
applying the Act’s moral turpitude provisions…My review of this case presents an 
opportunity to establish a uniform framework for ensuring that the Act’s moral turpitude 
provisions are fairly and accurately applied.”). 
190 See Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 91, at 1479; Anthony, Interpretive 
Rules, supra note 163, at 1373.     
191 See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 7. 
192 See id. at 4-6.   
193 In Home Box Office, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the D.C. Circuit reasoned that an 
agency’s reliance on ex parte communications after a notice of rulemaking in informal 
rulemaking was improper because (1) a court cannot assess the truth of the agency’s 
assertions if the knowledge was gained without the benefit of the adversarial process and 
(2) a court must assess whether the agency’s rule is sufficient based on the whole record; 
ex parte communication leaves out a piece of this record.  Id. at 51-57; see also id. at 56 
(“Equally important is the inconsistency of secrecy with fundamental notions of fairness 
implicit in due process and with the ideal of reasoned decisionmaking on the merits which 
undergirds all of our administrative law.”); but see Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (refusing to interpret the APA to mandate disclosures that the statute did 
not clearly require and discussing the benefits of informal communications to agencies).  
Professor Bressman writes that from a positive political theory standpoint, ex parte 
communications are problematic, “not so much because they imperil basic fairness or allow 
political compromise to guide agency decisions…[r]ather, they are problematic because 
they deprive outsiders of access to information about agency action.”  Bressman, 
Procedures as Politics, supra note 148, at 1787. 
194 See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 95, at 506. 
195 See Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 91, at 1479. 
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Which affected parties did the AG exclude from the decisionmaking 
process, and what considerations would they have brought to the table?  
First, the AG did not seek input from his own immigration judges on how 
this decision would impact their workload.  The categorical approach 
developed in immigration law largely out of a desire for administrative 
efficiency.196  In fiscal year 2009, the fifty-five immigration courts in the 
U.S. received 391,829 cases to hear and completed 352,233 such cases;197 
these numbers indicate that each judge completed an average of 1,500 
cases.198  Given the high volume of cases, the categorical approach ensures 
a more efficient removal hearing.199   
                                                          
196 See Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I&N Dec. at 335.  However, one circuit court judge, writing in 
1971, opined about the introduction of the categorical approach into immigration law: 
At the time the rule was first expounded, it is probable that many, if not most, 
federal administrative agencies were deemed by courts to be incapable of deciding 
such complex questions as when an act ‘involved moral turpitude’ from the 
standpoint both of expertise and of proper role.  Administrative law has evolved 
considerably since that time.  In contemporary government we are quite prepared 
to delegate innumerable complicated and subtle questions like this one to 
administrative agencies.  To the extent that the rule was developed because of a 
then-justified fear of administrative incapacity, an extent which is not revealed by 
the decisions, it should long since have lost its force. 
Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1027 (8th Cir. 1971) (Eisele, J., dissenting). 
197 Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) Statistical Yearbook, FY 2009, B1-
B2, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy09syb.pdf.    
198 The Honorable Dana Leigh Marks, President of the National Association of 
Immigration Judges (“NAIJ”), recently stated: 
[W]hile the average Federal district judge has a pending caseload of 400 cases and 
three law clerks to assist, in Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2009, immigration judges 
completed over 1500 cases per judge on average, with a ratio of one law clerk for 
every four judges.  Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that a recent 
study found immigration judges suffered greater stress and burnout than prison 
wardens or doctors in busy hospitals. 
Written Statement of Hon. Dana Leigh Marks, President, NAIJ, Before the Subcommittee 
on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary on Oversight Hearing on the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (June 17, 2010), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Marks100617.pdf (citing Burnout and Stress 
Among United States Immigration Judges, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 2 (2008) and 
Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the National Association of 
Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 57 (2008)).  The 
General Accounting Office in 2006 noted the need for immigration judges to better control 
their caseload.  See Executive Office for Immigration Review: Caseload Performance 
Reporting Needs Improvement, GAO-06-771 (August 11, 2006), available at 
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-771.   
199 See Letter from Carolyn B. Lamm, President, ABA, to Eric H. Holder, Jr. Att’y Gen., 2 
(Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter “ABA Letter”] (“The categorical approach streamlines the 
complex immigration system by providing immigration adjudicators with a mechanism to 
determine the consequences of a criminal conviction by reference only to the criminal 
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In response to Silva-Trevino, the National Association of 
Immigration Judges issued a statement on the decision’s impact on the 
immigration courts.200  The judges wrote, “[i]in a court system that has been 
widely recognized as overburdened and lacking sufficient resources, the 
heightened level of inquiry mandated by Silva-Trevino has the potential to 
cause an inordinate amount of additional work for immigration judges.”201  
The judges were concerned that the decision “implicates complicated legal 
arguments in such cases and creates the prospect of a significant amount of 
additional hearing time to resolve the factual and legal issues it 
creates…”202  The AG mentioned administrative efficiency in his 
decision,203 yet he provided no solution for immigration judges to control 
their dockets; the decision merely made the empty promise that the new 
approach was “not an invitation to re-litigate the conviction itself.”204  
                                                                                                                                                   
statute and, in some cases, the criminal court record of conviction.”); see also Dulal-
Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 132 (“We have emphasized that the BIA and reviewing courts are 
ill-suited to readjudicate the basis of prior criminal convictions…It was this very concern 
about collateral trials, and the oppressive administrative burden they impose, that led the 
BIA to adopt (and us to endorse) the categorical approach to removability in the first 
instance.”).  In 1996, the BIA summarized the administrative efficiency arguments for 
using the categorical approach: 
[T]he principle of not looking behind a record of conviction provides this Board 
with the only workable approach in cases where deportability is premised on the 
existence of a conviction.  If we were to allow evidence that is not part of the 
record of conviction as proof [of deportability], we essentially would be inviting 
the parties to present and any all evidence bearing on an alien’s conduct leading to 
the conviction, including possibly the arresting officer’s testimony or even the 
testimony of eyewitnesses who may have been at the scene of the crime.  Such an 
endeavor is inconsistent both with the streamlined adjudication that a deportation 
hearing is intended to provide and with the settled proposition that an Immigration 
Judge cannot adjudicate guilt or innocence. 
Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I&N Dec. at 335. 
200 “Impact of Silva-Trevino on the Immigration Courts,”  Statement of the NAIJ, attached 
to email from Immigration Judge Denise Slavin, dated April 1, 2010 (on file with author) 
[hereinafter “NAIJ Statement”]. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 702. 
204 Id. at 703.  The AG, in a footnote, cited some examples of how judges would apply his 
new approach.  See id. at 703 n.3.  However, these examples merely reiterate the 
categorical approach; the AG did not explain what evidence a judge may consider to 
determine whether an offense involves moral turpitude if the statute is divisible and the 
record of conviction is not clear.  The AG did not discuss, for example, whether a judge 
should accept a hearsay document (such as a police report) proving that a respondent’s 
offense involves moral turpitude.  While the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply and 
thus hearsay is not per se barred from immigration court, evidence submitted in removal 
hearings must be probative and its use must be fundamentally fair.  See Bustos-Torres v. 
INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec. 609, 611 (BIA 
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Presumably, the AG would concern himself with the workload of 
immigration judges, as they are Department of Justice employees, yet their 
concerns were not heard or considered before the publication of Silva-
Trevino.         
The AG also did not seek input from immigrants’ rights 
organizations, who could have foreseen the myriad of problems stemming 
from the abandonment of the categorical approach, which inevitably leads 
to the re-litigation of past crimes.205  How would detained, pro se 
respondents in removal proceedings206 re-litigate criminal cases when they 
are often detained far from where their convictions take place?207  How 
would any respondent re-litigate these cases without the formal rules of 
evidence,208 Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury,209 Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                                                                   
1988).  In many cases, using a hearsay document such as a police report would be 
fundamentally unfair to prove removability.  See id.; see also Yongo v. INS, 355 F.3d 27, 
31 (1st Cir. 2004) (reasoning that “highly unreliable hearsay might raise due process 
problems”).  Additionally, if an immigration judge allows a hearsay document into 
evidence to prove the nature of the crime, the judge also should allow the noncitizen to 
present testimony or other evidence on the nature of the crime in order to protect the 
noncitizen’s right to present evidence on his own behalf.  See 8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(4).  
Thus, the only way to circumvent a violation of a respondent’s due process and statutory 
rights is to engage in what may amount to a retrial of the criminal case in immigration 
court, which the AG claimed would not happen as a result of his decision in Silva-Trevino.  
See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 703.   
205 See note 204, supra. 
206 Respondents often are pro se pro se, since persons in removal proceedings do not have 
the right to a court-appointed attorney.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A).  In addition, many 
respondents who face removal for a criminal conviction are subject to mandatory detention 
because of their criminal offenses, which makes it difficult for them to get pro bono 
assistance.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); see also EOIR Statistical Yearbook FY 2009, supra 
note 197, at G1 (showing that in fiscal year 2009, 176,146  respondents – sixty-one percent 
of the total number of cases heard by immigration courts – appeared pro se in removal 
proceedings).  These factors are exacerbated due to the shorter case calendar for these 
cases, which gives a detainee even less time to prepare defenses to removal.  See, e.g., 
Immigration Court Practice Manual, § 9.1(e), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htm (noting that proceedings 
for detained noncitizens are expedited).   
207 See ABA Letter, supra note 199, at 2 (citing Huge Increase in Transfers of ICE 
Detainees, Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (Dec. 2, 2009), available at 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/220 and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Policies and Procedures Relating to Detainee Transfers, Department of Homeland 
Security, Office of Inspector General (Dec. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_); see also Letter to the Honorable Eric H. 
Holder from American Immigration Law Foundation (“AILF”) et al re Silva-Trevino, 2 
(dated March 3, 2009) [hereinafter “AILF Letter”].   
208 See Baliza v. INS, 709 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Administrative proceedings 
are not, however, bound by strict rules of evidence.”); In re Rina, 15 I&N Dec. 453, 455 
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exclusionary rule210 and Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination?211  How would respondents re-litigate cases that are decades 
old, yet now form the basis of removal, when witnesses are unavailable, 
memories have faded, documents have been misplaced and evidence is 
stale?212   
There are other problems arising from Silva-Trevino that 
immigrants’ rights groups could have raised during the decisionmaking 
process.  For example, would the decision have a retroactive effect on 
noncitizens who accepted guilty pleas in reliance on the categorical 
approach?213  Would the decision wreak havoc on the criminal justice 
system, since many noncitizens would no longer accept guilty pleas without 
the predictability of the categorical approach?214  Several of these issues 
                                                                                                                                                   
(BIA 1975) (“Those rules [the Federal Rules of Evidence], of course, have no binding 
effect in administrative deportation hearings.”). 
209 See Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 132 (“[I]t goes without saying that there is no Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury determination of removability.”). 
210 The Supreme Court has stated, in dicta, that the exclusionary rule may only apply in 
immigration proceedings if there has been an egregious violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984). 
211 See In re R, 4 I&N Dec. 720, 721 (BIA 1952) (“The fifth amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States protects a witness testifying in deportation proceedings from giving 
evidence which would tend to show his guilt under a Federal criminal statute.  Where there 
is no such showing, an alien may be compelled to testify.”). 
212 See ABA Letter, supra note 199; AILF Letter, supra note 207, at 2.  Since there is no 
statute of limitations on most criminal grounds of removal, a removal hearing can be based 
on a conviction where the events in question occurred years ago.  See, e.g., In re Lettman, 
22 I&N Dec. 365 (BIA 1998) (holding that a noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony 
is subject to deportation regardless of the date of the conviction when the alien is placed in 
deportation proceedings on or after March 1, 1991, and the crime falls within the 
aggravated felony definition).   
213 See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 n.12 
(1984) (“an administrative agency may not apply a new rule retroactively when to do so 
would unduly intrude upon reasonable reliance interests”); Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 203 
(holding that an agency may give retroactive force to a new rule created through 
administrative action, but “the retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of 
producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable 
principles”); Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 950-953 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that the BIA’s new rule, announced in an adjudication, that drug trafficking crimes are per 
se “particularly serious crimes” that bar an applicant from protection from persecution 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) was impermissibly applied retroactively to the respondent in 
the case); see also Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 
380, 391  (D.C. Cir. 1972) (establishing five-factor balancing test for determining whether 
an agency impermissibly applied an adjudicatory decision to a party). 
214 This question is of considerable importance in light of the Supreme Court’s 2010 
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), in which the Court held that it was 
ineffective assistance of counsel for a defense attorney to fail to advise a noncitizen about 
the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.  See id. at 1482-83; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 
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could have been more thoroughly explored, if, prior to the publication of 
Silva-Trevino, the Attorney General had reached out to groups such as 
immigrants’ rights organizations,215 the American Bar Association216 or his 
own immigration judges.217  Had the agency used formal procedures, it 
could have guaranteed “the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a 
pronouncement of such force”218 by “giving people an opportunity to be 
heard and offering reasoned responses to what people have to say.”219  
The Silva-Trevino decision-making process highlights Professor 
Bressman’s argument that procedures perform an important role in 
Congressional oversight of agencies, which is why the Supreme Court 
placed such value on procedures in Mead.220  Congress monitors 
immigration agencies through “fire alarm” oversight;221 it relies on private 
parties to gather information and notify Congress of proposed changes to 
regulatory practice.222  Administrative procedures allow constituents a role 
in the agency’s decision-making process, so that constituents can alert 
Congress to changes long before the agency irreversibly alters the status 
quo.223  In the Silva-Trevino decision-making process, immigrants’ rights 
organizations, the ABA and immigration judges could have alerted 
Congress that the agency was considering an overhaul of the categorical 
approach.224  In light of the cost and due process concerns raised, Congress 
                                                                                                                                                   
533 U.S. 289, 323 n.50 (2001) (reasoning that “competent defense counsel, following the 
advice of numerous practice guides,” would advise a noncitizen about the immigration 
consequences of a guilty plea).  The categorical approach allows attorneys to more 
accurately predict the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.  See ABA Letter, supra 
note 199, at 3 (stating that under Silva-Trevino, “defense attorneys are unable to reliably 
predict the immigration consequences of contemplated dispositions.  The resulting 
uncertainty will make fewer immigrant defendants willing to enter into plea agreements, 
thereby increasing the number of trials and imposing a substantial new burden on the 
criminal justice system as a whole.”).  Circuit courts have reasoned that the categorical 
approach jurisprudence in immigration law “has provided predictability, enabling aliens to 
better understand the immigration consequences of a particular conviction.”  Jean-Louis, 
582 F.3d at 482; see also Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008).   
215 See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58; see also AILF Letter, supra note 207. 
216 See ABA Letter, supra note 199 (urging Attorney General Holder to withdraw AG 
Mukasey’s decision in Silva-Trevino); ABA RESOLUTION 113: PRESERVING THE 
CATEGORICAL APPROACH IN IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATIONS (Aug. 4, 2009) [hereinafter 
“ABA Resolution”]. 
217 See NAIJ Statement, supra note 200.   
218 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230. 
219 See Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 225. 
220 See Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 86, at 570. 
221 Id. (citing McCubbins and Schwartz, supra note 143, at 166). 
222 Id.   
223 See id. 
224 See AILF Letter, supra note 207; ABA Letter, supra note 199; ABA Resolution, supra 
note 216; NAIJ Statement, supra note 200; Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58. 
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may have decided to entrench the categorical approach by amending the 
INA.225  Yet, these groups did not have the opportunity to comment until 
after the decision was a fait accompli.226  Even a mere notice to Mr. Silva-
Trevino about the issues that the AG would consider, or a request for 
amicus briefing on the issue, would have allowed requisite political 
participation to ensure adequate Congressional oversight.227   
The Silva-Trevino decision-making process also highlights scholars’ 
argument that courts should take cues from the agency by the procedures it 
uses and provide deference accordingly.228  Professor Stephenson, 
explaining Mead’s rationale, states: “courts tend to view formal process as a 
proxy for variables that the court considers important but cannot observe 
directly, such as the significance of the issue to the agency’s mission or the 
degree to which the agency’s judgment reflects a sensible balancing of the 
relevant considerations.”229   Thus, agencies that want to advocate a more 
aggressive reading of a statute “must decide whether it is worth paying the 
costs associated with formal procedures in order to ‘purchase’ greater 
judicial toleration of a more aggressive interpretation of the statute.”230  The 
AG in Silva-Trevino advocated for an aggressive interpretation of the 
statute, one that changed years of case law.231  Yet, the agency, by using 
such paltry procedures, gave the signal to courts that the new moral 
turpitude test is of limited importance, and certainly not important enough 
to spend money writing regulations or even asking for outside input in an 
adjudication.232  Thus, courts should provide a check on the agency’s 
actions in Silva-Trevino; because the agency acted expeditiously and 
informally, courts should not confer Chevron deference.233  Had the agency 
followed formal procedures, these procedures would have provided their 
own checks on the agency action, so a court could more easily defer to the 
decision.234  
                                                          
225 See id. 
226 See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 7-11. 
227 See Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 148, at 1785.  In other important 
immigration decisions, the BIA has requested briefing from immigrants’ rights 
organizations.  See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 8-9 (citing In re Soriano, 21 
I&N Dec. 516 (AG 1997) and In re Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I&N Dec. 262 (AG 1990), as 
examples of cases in which prior attorneys general sought input from the public in the form 
of amicus briefs).   
228 See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 93, at 547-48; Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra 
note 3, at 225-26. 
229 Stephenson, supra note 93, at 530-31.   
230 Id. at 531. 
231 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 690, 696-704. 
232 See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 7-11. 
233 See Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 225-26. 
234 See id. 
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B. The Choice of Adjudication Over Rulemaking 
 
In Silva-Trevino, the AG chose to overhaul the categorical approach 
through adjudication instead of notice-and-comment rulemaking.  
Adjudication has its advantages in that it is more efficient and less costly to 
the agency; the agency also can frame the issues more narrowly in 
adjudication.235  The Supreme Court has held that the agency has wide 
discretion to choose between rulemaking and adjudication.236 However, 
courts need not give Chevron deference to the end product of that choice of 
policymaking form;237 rather, Mead announced a rule that “structures 
scope-of-review doctrine systematically by telling all agencies that there is a 
link between the policymaking form chosen and the standard of review 
applied.”238   
There are good reasons for a reviewing court to decide, in the case 
of Silva-Trevino, that “the choice of adjudication over rulemaking for 
making policy for making policy [was] significant if not suspect.”239  First, 
the categorical approach that the Attorney General upended was well-
entrenched; noncitizens had relied substantially and in good faith on the 
                                                          
235 See Magill, supra note 91, at 1397. 
236 See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 203.  The Court also has held that adjudications should 
command Chevron deference in the same manner that rulemaking commands deference.  
See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999).   
237 See Magill, supra note 91, at 1425 (“an agency can choose its form…but it does not 
choose what follows from that choice.  What follows- the process the agency must follow; 
the legal effect of its action; and whether, when and under what the standard the action can 
be challenged in court – are fixed by other sources of law.”); see also id. at 1405 
(explaining the Chenery II principle, which is an “otherwise puzzling judicial reaction to 
agency choice of procedure” by arguing that “because the judiciary has indirect 
opportunities to shape the consequences of an agency’s choice of form, it need not directly 
evaluate the choice of form in any given case.”). 
238 Id. at 1431. 
239 See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 95, at 536.  Professor Bressman 
discusses the Chenery II decision, in which the Court stated that agencies have broad 
discretion to choose procedures; however, she notes that Chenery II was decided in 1947, 
when agencies hardly used rulemaking.  Today, she argues, “agencies now routinely use 
rulemaking, which makes the choice of adjudication over rulemaking for making policy 
significant if not suspect.”  Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 95, at 535-36; 
see also id. at 537 (“Mead…begins a partial weaning from Chenery II and unlimited choice 
of procedures.  As such, it shows that administrative law has begun to record a concern for 
arbitrariness in this area.”); see also Magill, supra note 91, at 1384-85 (“In the 1950s and 
1960s, most administrative agencies implemented their statutes by deciding individual 
cases; by the 1970s, a detectable shift had occurred and most administrative agencies 
pursued their mandates by promulgating legislative rules.”). 
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previous interpretation, which had existed for over a century.240  Also, the 
new policy announced in Silva-Trevino is not context-specific or so 
specialized that it is impossible to capture in a rule.241  Rather, the agency 
wished to create a new framework for deciding all moral turpitude cases, 
not just cases with facts similar to Mr. Silva-Trevino’s.242  When, as in 
Silva-Trevino, the agency is considering a ruling that is both well-
entrenched and not context-specific, it is preferable to make policy by 
rulemaking, “rather than by picking a sacrificial lamb and making policy 
through adjudication.”243   
The AG chose adjudication to announce the overhaul of the 
categorical approach, but did he respect the elements of the form of 
policymaking he chose?244  The APA does not govern removal 
proceedings;245 therefore, the adjudication in Silva-Trevino does not fall 
squarely into the box of a “formal” or “informal” adjudication.246  However, 
it clearly was an adjudication affecting liberty interests and therefore must 
comply with the requirements of due process.247  Consistent with the 
notions of due process, parties should be given notice of the potential 
change in law and allowed to brief the issues; the adversarial system allows 
both parties to present arguments to a neutral adjudicator and contest their 
opponents’ arguments.248  The agency must respond to each argument in 
order to pass judicial scrutiny under the reasoned decision-making 
                                                          
240 See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 295; Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban 
Development, 88 F.3d 739, 748 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Adjudication is best suited for 
incremental developments to the law, rather than great leaps forward.”); Magill, supra note 
91, at 1424. 
241 See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294; Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202-03; Magill, supra note 
91, at 1424. 
242 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 689 (“[T]his opinion establishes an administrative 
framework for determining whether an alien has been convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude.”). 
243 See Magill, supra note 91, at 1424.   
244 See id. at 1410-11 (“[A]n agency is generally free to choose among all of its available 
policymaking forms and, as long as the agency respects the elements of the form it has 
chosen, its choice of preferred form will not be directly evaluated by courts.”). 
245 See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1954) (reasoning that the legislative history 
of the INA indicates a desire by Congress to incorporate some, but not all, of the 
procedural protections of the APA into the INA).   
246 See note 97, supra, for a description of the procedural differences between formal and 
informal adjudications. 
247 See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 
86, 100-01 (1903). 
248 See Chike v. INS, 948 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1991) (due process violation found when pro 
se respondent in deportation hearing was not given notice of the BIA’s briefing schedule 
and the government was allowed to file a brief); Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 
7-8. 
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requirement.249  Thus, in adjudications, “public input is ensured, and the 
agency has a substantial incentive to be responsive to that input.”250  While 
public input is not guaranteed in the same manner as in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking,251 stakeholders often have opportunity for input through amicus 
briefs, either requested by the agency252 or by a party to the adjudication.253 
                                                          
249 The “reasoned decision-making requirement” or “hard look doctrine,” requires the 
agency to explain its reasons enough to determine whether its decision was arbitrary and 
capricious.   See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 407-08, 
420 (1971) (remanding a decision to approve construction of a highway through a park 
because the agency did not state the reasons for choosing that particular route and holding 
that the agency must offer “some explanation” to allow the court to determine whether “the 
[agency] acted within…[its] authority and if the [agency’s] action was justifiable under the 
applicable standard”); see also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (applying the reasoned decision-
making requirement to notice-and-comment rulemaking and defining an agency decision 
that was arbitrary and capricious as one that 1) relied on factors Congress did not intend it 
to consider; 2) entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem; 3) offered an 
explanation for decision-making that runs counter to evidence before the agency; or 4) was 
so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a difference in view or product of agency 
expertise); Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 95, at 476 (discussing that the 
passage of the APA in 1946 allowed judges to seize on the “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard of review contained therein and require agencies to produce a record reflecting 
consideration of all relevant issues to facilitate judicial review).  Because the agency’s 
decision must not be arbitrary and capricious, the agency must anticipate problems with its 
reasoning.  Scholars argue that the best way to anticipate such problems is to open up the 
process to challengers before the decision is final; formal procedures facilitate this crucial 
input from the public.  See, e.g., Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 148, at 
1781. 
250 Merrill and Hickman, supra note 3, at 885. 
251 See id. at 886 (“At a minimum, at least one interested party will exist to act as the virtual 
representative of other similarly situated persons.”). 
252 For example, in Wyman-Gordon, the Supreme Court discussed how the NLRB had 
“invited certain interested parties” to file briefs and participate in oral arguments prior to its 
ruling in Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), which set forth a new 
policy requiring employers to provide unions with lists of names of employees before 
elections.  See Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 762-63 (quoting Excelsior Underwear, 156 
N.L.R.B. at 1238); see also Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58 at 8-9 (citing In re 
Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516, and In re Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I&N Dec. 262, as examples of 
cases in which prior attorneys general sought input from the public in the form of amicus 
briefs). 
253 See Merrill and Hickman, supra note 3, at 886.  Professor Magill writes: 
As courts encouraged and embraced notice-and-comment rulemaking as a 
policymaking tool, the exclusion of parties from adjudication began to look 
anachronistic.  Instead of requiring agencies to rely on rulemaking under certain 
circumstances, the courts recognized participation rights for parties who were 
interested in (but were not the objects of) adjudications and thus made some 
adjudications look a little bit more like rulemaking. 
Magill, supra note 91, at 1440. 
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Silva-Trevino is an example of adjudication in its least participatory 
form.  The basic requirements for due process were not met.  Mr. Silva-
Trevino was given no notice of the potential change in law;254 moreover, it 
is highly likely that Mr. Silva-Trevino’s opponents, in ex parte 
communications with the office of the Attorney General,255 were allowed to 
make their case without an opposing party present.256  The AG did not ask 
for any briefing from interested stakeholders; nor could Mr. Silva-Trevino 
ask for amici to weigh in because he did not know that the AG was 
considering a major overhaul of the categorical approach until after the 
publication of the decision.257  Adjudication at its best can be closer to the 
deliberation that occurs in notice-and-comment rulemaking.258  
Adjudication at its worst, i.e., Silva-Trevino, should command less 
deference from courts because of the due process violations to the 
individual and the lack of deliberation by the agency.259 
                                                          
254 See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58 at 7. 
255 Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 9 (“[I]t appears highly likely that the 
certification process in this case began with some ex parte communication with the 
Attorney General.”); see also id. at 10 (“[T]here is a troubling possibility that the 
certification process in this case may have been used by the Office of Immigration 
Litigation to shore up its litigation positions in court.”). 
256 In immigration cases, the APA’s strict prohibition on ex parte communication in 
adjudications does not apply because the APA does not apply to removal proceedings.  See 
5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d); Marcello, 349 U.S. at 310.  However, the due process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment guarantees a neutral judge.  See Vasha v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 863, 
872 (6th Cir. 2005).  In a challenge to the use of ex parte communications in the 
immigration context, the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania stated: 
The decisions of EOIR adjudicators are entitled to a ‘presumption of regularity,’ 
and a party alleging irregularity bears the burden of proving it…Consequently, in 
order to warrant a hearing on their claim of political interference and ex parte 
communications, Petitioners must make a ‘strong showing’ of impropriety by 
administrative officials. 
Yi v. Reno, 925 F. Supp. 320, 330 (M. D. Pa. 1996) (citing McLeod v. INS, 802 
F.2d 89, 95 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986) and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 
420). 
In Sierra Club, Judge Patricia Wald reasoned that ex parte communications are permissible 
in rulemaking because “our form of government could not function efficiently or rationally 
if key executive policymakers were isolated from each other and from the Chief 
Executive.”  Sierra Club, 657 F.3d at 300.  However, Judge Wald reasoned that one 
instance where it is necessary to reveal ex parte communications is when “such 
conversations directly concern the outcome of adjudications or quasi-adjudicatory 
proceedings” because “there is no inherent executive power to control the rights on 
individuals in such settings.”  Id. at 303.   
257 Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 6.  
258 See Magill, supra note 91, at 1440; see also id. at 1397 (noting that there is often a more 
extensive vetting of views if the agency presents its view to an administrative tribunal). 
259 In Alaska Dep’t of Health and Social Servs. v. Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
424 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit examined an agency’s adjudication 
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It would go too far to suggest that the Silva-Trevino decision only 
merits Chevron deference is if the agency followed the strict requirements 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking.260  In Mead, the Court did not require 
agencies to use the most formal procedures to command Chevron 
deference;261 standard procedures such as notice-and-comment rulemaking 
and adjudication are mere examples of the types of procedures that are 
acceptable to guarantee Chevron deference.262  Professor Bressman states, 
“unmitigated formalism is neither necessary or wise…We instead should 
afford Congress or agencies a little leeway to create administrative 
lawmaking procedures beyond trial-type or paper hearings.” 263  However, 
courts should “require that those procedures adhere to certain specified 
limits – in particular, that the resulting policy is transparent, rational, and 
binding.”264  As the decision-making process in Silva-Trevino was neither 
transparent, nor its results rational, the decision should not merit Chevron 
deference. 
 
C. Can Silva-Trevino Survive Step Zero? 
 
Courts reviewing Silva-Trevino have adequate reasons to decide that 
the decision passes Chevron step zero.  First, the AG’s decision in Silva-
Trevino has binding effect on future parties.265  Silva-Trevino was published 
and thus precedent-setting,266 making its binding effect “immediate and 
                                                                                                                                                   
under Mead and conferred Chevron deference to the decision because of the multiple 
opportunities for participation by the parties and deliberation by the agency.  Id. at 939.  
The court stated: 
Here, the formal administrative process afforded the State included the 
opportunities to petition for reconsideration, brief its arguments, be heard at a 
formal hearing, receive reasoned decisions at multiple levels of review, and 
submit exceptions to those decisions.  These hallmarks of ‘fairness and 
deliberation’ are clear evidence that Congress intended the Administrator’s final 
determination to ‘carry the force of law. 
Id. 
260 See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 95, at 535 (discussing scholars’ praise 
for notice-and-comment rulemaking to set policy, but observing “when push comes to 
shove, few scholars want to reduce agency flexibility”); Anthony, Which Agency 
Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, supra note 76, at 46 (“It is 
manifestly too late in the day to suggest that Chevron acceptance should apply only to 
interpretations embodies in legislative rules.”). 
261 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. 
262 Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 91, at 1450. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. 
265 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 138, at 774-75. 
266 The regulation provides: 
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irrevocable until officially renounced.”267 The decision’s binding effect 
distinguishes it from the tariff ruling letter at issue in Mead, for which the 
“binding character as a ruling stop[ped] short of third parties.”268  While 
other importers were warned against assuming any right of detrimental 
reliance on the tariff ruling letter in Mead,269 any noncitizen facing CIMT 
charges is subject to the AG’s new approach.270     
Binding effect is also “the promise of consistent application.”271  
One might question how Silva-Trevino promises consistent application, due 
to the decision’s clear inconsistency with over a century of practice.272  Yet, 
this type of change in agency position should merit the same level of 
deference as an original agency interpretation.  The Supreme Court in 
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Services273 held that “[a]gency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to 
analyze the agency’s interpretation under the Chevron framework.”274  The 
Court reasoned, “for if the agency adequately explains the reasons for a 
reversal of policy, ‘change is not invalidating, since the whole point of 
Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute 
with the implementing agency.”275  While the AG significantly changed 
immigration law, he explained his reasons for doing so, anticipating some 
of his opponents’ arguments and rebutting them in a lengthy decision.276   
Notwithstanding these considerations, the Silva-Trevino decision 
should not survive Chevron step zero.  The decision’s binding effect alone 
should not be enough to create the “force of law.”277  Merely calling the 
decision precedent does not automatically confer Chevron deference; the 
Mead Court stated: “precedential value alone does not add up to Chevron 
                                                                                                                                                   
By majority vote of the permanent Board members, selected decisions of the 
Board rendered by a three-member panel or by the Board en banc may be 
designated to serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or 
issues. Selected decisions designated by the Board, decisions of the Attorney 
General, and decisions of the Secretary of Homeland Security to the extent 
authorized in paragraph (i) of this section, shall serve as precedents in all 
proceedings involving the same issue or issues. 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g). 
267 See Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 91, at 1488-89. 
268 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 233. 
269 See id. at 233 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(c)). 
270 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 688; see generally Tooby and Kesselbrenner, supra 
note 45. 
271 Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 91, at 1488-89. 
272 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 688-704; Mylius, 201 F. at 863. 
273 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
274 See id. at 981. 
275 Id. (citing Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)).   
276 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 688-704. 
277 See Merrill, supra note 126, at 817.  
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entitlement.”278  Reflecting on this sentence from the Mead decision, 
Professor Merrill states, “[t]his would seem to negate any claim that 
authority to articulate a rule of decision is a sufficient condition of power to 
act with the force of law.”279 
Why is declaring an agency decision precedent insufficient to create 
the “force of law?”  In the context of agency adjudication, precedential 
value does not confer the “force of law” in the same manner as court-made 
precedential case law.  Professor Richard Murphy has noted, “[t]he law-like 
quality of case-law flows from precedential force; one should expect an 
interpretation of law adopted in a given case to function as law in later cases 
precisely because stare decisis requires courts to defer to past judicial 
opinions.”280  As underscored by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X, 
an agency, unlike a court, can easily alter well-settled precedent, “provided 
that its explanation for its departure can survive judicial review for 
arbitrariness.  Because agency ‘precedents’ do not bind later agency 
decision-making in any serious way, they do not possess the same potential 
as judicial precedents to create generally applicable and binding law.”281  In 
Silva-Trevino, the AG suddenly reversed years of case law, invoking Brand 
X to remind challengers that agencies can change their minds.282  The ease 
with which he could make such a change conflicts with the “rule-of-law 
idea that regulated parties ought to be able to identify the law and to expect 
that it will persist for some reasonable period of time.”283   
Moreover, the decision is binding in name only, as the AG did not 
“exercise [his lawmaking] authority in ways that generally promote 
consistency and specifically prevent ad hoc departures at the behest of 
                                                          
278 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 232 (reasoning that interpretive rules may sometimes function as 
precedents, but are not accorded Chevron deference “as a class”). 
279 See Merrill, supra note 126, at 817 (emphasis in original). 
280 Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of Law,  66 
OHIO ST. L. J. 1013, 1042 (2005) [hereinafter Murphy, Judicial Deference]. 
281 Id.  Professor Murphy argues for a “commitment theory,” under which courts should 
give Chevron deference to agency decisions that reflect a longstanding commitment or 
those that are difficult for the agency to change in the future (because, for example, the 
agency interpretation was promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking, which 
would require new rulemaking to change).  See id. at 1065.  Agency interpretations 
announced in formal adjudications do not have the promise of consistent application 
because they can be amended cheaply by the agency “with little or no procedural ado.”  Id. 
at 1071.  Therefore, he disagrees with the majority in Mead that formal adjudications 
should receive Chevron deference.  See id. at 1071-72.  
282 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 689. 
283 See Murphy, Judicial Deference, supra note 280, at 1026; see also Jonathan Masur, 
Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 
1040-41 (2007) (arguing that post-Brand X, agencies will have great difficulty persuading 
private parties to rely on agency interpretations). 
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narrow interests.”284  Professor Bressman writes, “[b]y announcing a rule 
that binds all similarly situated parties, agencies may stem requests for 
deviations except through official channels.”285  As noted by the amici who 
asked the AG to reconsider his decision in Silva-Trevino, it appears that the 
AG abandoned the traditional categorical approach upon request of the 
Office of Immigration Litigation (“OIL”) of the Department of Justice, 
which wanted to shore up its litigation positions in court.286  It appears that 
OIL was permitted to request a deviation from prior case law through 
unofficial channels, namely, ex parte communication.287  The agency’s 
sudden abrupt departure from over a century of case law seemed to be 
tailored to the narrow interests of OIL, without considering the views of the 
many others whom the decision impacted.288   
Another reason for courts to give deference to Silva-Trevino is 
because the decision was authoritative: it “represent[s] the official position 
of the expert agency.”289  The decision was rendered by the head of the 
Department of Justice,290 thus distinguishing it from decisions such as the 
tariff letters in Mead, which were written by low-level agency officials who 
did not have the same authority over agency policy.291  The Silva-Trevino 
                                                          
284 Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 95, at 539; see also Bressman, How Mead 
Has Muddled, supra note 91, at 1479-80 (“The Constitution…demands consistent 
application, as evident by Article I, the Due Process Clause, and elsewhere.  Thus, it 
requires procedural formalities to promote predictable and fair lawmaking, not simply 
accountable lawmaking.”). 
285 Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 95, at 539. 
286 See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 10.  The agency’s attempt to look behind 
the record of conviction already had met some resistance in the circuit courts; for example, 
the Second Circuit rejected the BIA’s decision in Gertsenshteyn, which allowed for a 
factual inquiry into whether a prostitution aggravated felony offense was committed for 
commercial advantage.  See Gertsenshteyn v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 137, 147-49 (2d Cir. 
2008).  The Second Circuit stated: “[t]hat the Government finds that task [proving 
removability through the use of the record of conviction] difficult in some cases is no 
reason for immigration courts to renounce the restrictions that the courts have said the law 
requires.”  Id. at 148.     
287 See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 10.   
288 See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 95, at 539; see also AILF Letter, 
supra note 207; ABA Letter, supra note 199; ABA Resolution, supra note 216; NAIJ 
Statement, supra note 200; Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58. 
289 See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 591 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring). 
290 In their article Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, Barron and Kagan illustrate their 
argument that only authoritative decisions should receive Chevron deference by using as an 
example the Attorney General deciding an immigration law issue.  See Barron and Kagan, 
supra note 125, at 262-63 (citing Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425) (recognizing that this 
argument is inconsistent with Aguirre-Aguirre, in which the Court held that the BIA has 
power to give meaning to immigration statutory terms because the AG has vested the BIA 
with such power). 
291 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 233-34. 
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decision set forth a uniform policy to alter the behavior of regulated 
individuals; it was not one of thousands issued per year by low-level agency 
officials.292  Not only did the AG have the authority to make policy, but he 
clearly intended to exercise this authority to establish a new framework for 
determining whether an offense involves moral turpitude.293  Scholars, 
including Justice Kagan, have argued that the authority of the decision-
maker alone is sufficient to command Chevron deference;294 their 
arguments find support in Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Mead.295 
Justice Kagan and Professor Barron argue that courts should grant 
Chevron deference only if the head of the agency made the decision, as this 
approach promotes “accountability and discipline in decision-making.”296  
Silva-Trevino, however, is a case that disproves this theory.  Accountability 
is not served by awarding Chevron deference to the head of the agency 
when he acts on behalf of an administration that already has been voted out 
of office.297  A “midnight adjudication” such as Silva-Trevino presents a 
                                                          
292 See id. (“Any suggestion that rulings intended to have the force of law are being 
churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an agency’s 46 scattered offices is imply self-
refuting.”).  Professor Merrill, citing the Mead Court’s reasoning that a system that 
generates thousands of tariff classifications each year from different ports of entry with no 
systemic effect at coordination, states, “[t]he thought here seems to be that a delegation to 
an agency to act with the force of law will usually generate uniform rules throughout the 
agency’s jurisdiction.  A regulatory system unconcerned with whether like cases are treated 
alike is an unlikely candidate for the appellation ‘law.’”  Merrill, supra note 126, at 817. 
293 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 688 (“This opinion establishes an administrative 
framework for determining whether an alien has been convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude.”); cf. Mead, 533 U.S. at 307 (“It is difficult, in fact, to see in the agency practice 
itself any indication that Customs ever set out with a lawmaking pretense in mind when it 
undertook to make classifications like these.”).  Professor Koch discusses what he sees as 
two core questions that the Mead Court answered: first, did Congress delegate authority to 
make policy to the agency, and second, did the agency intend to exercise its policy-making 
function.  The Court answered the first question in the affirmative, and the second in the 
negative.  See Charles H. Koch, Judicial Review of Agency Policymaking, 44 WM AND 
MARY L. REV. 375, 398 (2002).  Unlike the agency in Mead, the AG, deciding Silva-
Trevino, intended to exercise his policy-making function.   
294 See Barron and Kagan, supra note 125, at 229. 
295 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 258 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Christensen, 529 U.S. at 591, 
n.* (Scalia, J., concurring). 
296 See Barron and Kagan, supra note 125, at 204. 
297 See Nina Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a 
New President Arrives, 78 N. Y. U. L. REV. 557, 566-67 (2003).  Professor Mendelson 
reasons that rulemaking occuring late in an administration can promote accountability 
because the electorate can participate in the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.  See 
id. at 636.  She argues that such “midnight rulemaking” raises the issue’s visibility, which 
arguably creates more public debate than the traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking 
process, in which primarily well-organized interest groups participate.  See id. at 635-36.  
She argues, however, that “[o]ther forms of policy entrenchment may lack significant 
potential to create dialogue, and, moreover, because of their lack of procedural discipline 
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great risk of abuse of power by an outgoing administration;298 the AG 
purposely could have chosen not to commence notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, which would have lasted long enough to spill over into the next 
administration and allow opposing views to dictate the results.299  As 
Professor Jack Beerman has stated, “[a]s the end of a term nears, the 
political costs of taking action may decrease, which may free an 
administration to take action that it could not have taken earlier in its 
term…[n]ear the end of a term, political costs and benefits may be less 
important to the administration…”300  Thus, AG Mukasey could “assume 
full and visible responsibility”301 for the Silva-Trevino ruling; yet, he 
suffered no repercussions, since he knew at the time of publication that his 
days as Attorney General were numbered.302   
The AG’s decision also lacked discipline, as there was insufficient 
deliberation that preceded Silva-Trevino’s publication.303  As discussed in 
Part IIIA, the AG concluded that his decision would not lead to the re-
litigation of past crimes; this error led him to inadequately weigh concerns 
such as administrative efficiency.304  This flaw in reasoning was not the 
only error of law contained in the opinion.305  Perhaps the AG did not have 
                                                                                                                                                   
and their narrow focus, coupled with the lack of electoral accountability, they may present 
a greater risk of abuse.”  Id. at 658.   
298 See id. at 658. 
299 See Masur, supra note 283, at 1069 (discussing why outgoing administrations do not 
have time to initiate notice-and-comment rulemaking between the election results and the 
new administration, which is why the “prototypical ‘eleventh hour’ executive actions are 
those that the President can undertake unilaterally and instantaneously”). 
300 Jack M. Beerman, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B. U. L. REV. 947, 958 (2003). 
301 See Barron and Kagan, supra note 125, at 256. 
302 See Beerman, supra note 300, at 958. 
303 See Barron and Kagan, supra note 125, at 204. 
304 See notes 196-99, supra, and accompanying text.    
305 For example, the AG discussed a “patchwork” of circuit court decisions on the use of 
the categorical approach; in the name of the uniform application of immigration law, he 
wished to create one approach to the CIMT analysis with his decision in Silva-Trevino.  
See Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 694.  Most of the cases cited by the AG demonstrated a 
circuit split on when an immigration adjudicator could look at the record of conviction and 
when a statute was actually divisible.  See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 474 n. 16 (“Although 
courts employ different labels to describe the categorical and modified categorical 
approaches, the fundamental methodology is the same.”).  In only one outlier case, Ali, had 
a court permitted an adjudicator to look behind the record of conviction.  See Silva-
Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 693-94; Ali, 521 F.3d at 743 (holding that an immigration judge 
can consider evidence outside of the record of conviction to determine whether an offense 
is a crime involving moral turpitude); see also Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 19 
n.12 (questioning the validity of the Ali decision because it was a panel decision that 
conflicted with prior panel decisions and noting the flaws in the Ali court’s reasoning).  The 
amici who challenged the Silva-Trevino decision stated: 
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time to adequately deliberate because the Silva-Trevino decision was rushed 
out during the final days of the Bush administration,306 in attempts to 
entrench the new policy before the opposing party took office.307  Perhaps 
the AG’s decision lacked meaningful review because he did not believe that 
his sense of professional responsibility and importance were at stake if he 
indiscriminately signed off on the decision.308  Perhaps the decision lacked 
accuracy and thoroughness due to the AG’s failure to “invite and consider 
comments of the world, including those of directly affected persons who are 
able, often uniquely, to supply pertinent information and analysis.”309 
Regardless of the cause, the AG’s opinion in Silva-Trevino, while 
authoritative, was not disciplined.   
Why should courts care about the discipline used by an agency to 
make a decision?  The leading normative theory for Chevron deference is 
that agencies have greater policy expertise than courts.310  Courts are 
                                                                                                                                                   
The decisions of the federal courts are uniform but for the outlier of the Seventh 
Circuit in Ali, which is the only cited decision that invites courts to look outside 
the record of conviction to determine if a person has been convicted of a crime 
involving moral turpitude.  By adopting this outlier as the basis of its ‘uniform’ 
approach, the Attorney General essentially guts the analysis adopted by the other 
federal circuits and creates the disuniformity it purportedly seeks to avoid. 
Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 13. 
In addition, the AG reasoned that “moral turpitude” is never an element of a noncitizen’s 
prior offense; while it is “simple” for a sentencing court employing the categorical 
approach to search for the necessary elements in the statute of conviction for the prior 
offense, an immigration court never will find “moral turpitude” listed in the elements of the 
statute.  Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. at 700-01.  However, the AG glossed over the 
precursor to the immigration judge conducting the categorical approach: the judge first 
looks to case law to determine which elements necessarily involve moral turpitude.  See 
Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 477-78.  Then the judge searches for evidence of those elements in 
the record of conviction if the statute is divisible.  The judge never looks for the words 
“moral turpitude” in the elements of the offense or the record of conviction.   
306 Cf. Richard Murphy, The Brand X Constitution, 2007 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1247, 1300 (2007) 
(citing Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, President of the United States (Dec. 
27, 1817), in 3 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 217, 221 (Philadelphia, J.B. 
Lippincott & Co. 1867)) (“[A] great deal of legislation does not receive serious, broad-
based scrutiny from members of Congress.  James Madison made this point nearly two 
hundred years ago, explaining that ‘midnight precedents’ – the result of last-minute, pell-
mell rush that attends the close of legislative sessions – deserves no one’s respect.”). 
307 See Beerman, supra note 300, at 956-59 (describing reasons why agencies may choose 
to wait until the end of the President’s term to take important administrative action). 
308 See Barron and Kagan, supra note 125, at 252. 
309 See Anthony, Interpretive Rules, supra note 163, at 1374 ; see also AILF Letter, supra 
note 207; ABA Letter, supra note 199; ABA Resolution, supra note 216; NAIJ Statement, 
supra note 200; Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58. 
310 See, e.g., Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 3, at 197; Elhauge, supra note 85, at 
2135.  Professor Ronald J. Krotoszynski, however, argues that while Chevron referenced 
agency expertise as a “background consideration supporting a rule of deference,” the result 
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generalists; agencies are specialists.311  “Specialists usually have a better 
grasp of technical terms or the practical consequences of a decision, and 
thus their views should be given deference by generalists.”312  Yet, agency 
decisions do not always receive such deference.  As Professor Murphy has 
explained: “[a]n agency’s comparative interpretive advantages can only 
matter where an agency actually makes use of them-an interpretation that an 
agency bases on astrology, for instance, has little claim to anyone’s 
respect.”313  Thus, “courts might justifiably engage in independent review 
where there are grounds for concluding that an agency has not done its 
interpretive ‘homework.’”314  In the Silva-Trevino decision-making process, 
the AG merely putting his name on the decision cannot make up for the 
failure to do his “interpretive ‘homework.’”315  
Justice Scalia would have liked the Mead majority to base its 
decision on the authoritativeness of the decision-maker, yet this was the 
dissent, not the majority opinion.316  The majority in Mead emphasized how 
the agency made its decision, not who made the decision.317  Of the possible 
indicators for whether an agency decision has the “force of law,” the Mead 
opinion “suggest[s] that chief among them is the degree of procedural 
formality involved in the action.”318  As discussed in this section, the 
agency’s decision-making process in Silva-Trevino was lacking in 
procedural formalities that would ensure the “fairness and deliberation that 
                                                                                                                                                   
was compelled by an implied delegation of lawmaking power to the agency.  Krotoszynski, 
supra note 125, at 739. 
311 See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L. J. 969, 
973 (1992). 
312 Id. 
313 See Murphy, Judicial Deference, supra note 280, at 1052. 
314 Id.  For example, in Negusie v. Holder, 129 S.Ct. 1159 (2009), the Court refused 
Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the statutory term “persecutor of others,” 
which precluded a grant of asylum or withholding of removal, because the BIA had not 
exercised its interpretive authority, but rather relied on a case interpreting the term in an 
entirely different statutory context.  See id. at 1166-67.  The Court remanded to the BIA for 
an initial determination of the statutory term in question.     
315 See Murphy, Judicial Deference, supra note 280, at 1052. 
316 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
317 See id. at 230 (“It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative 
action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative 
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a 
pronouncement of such force.”) 
318 See Barron and Kagan, supra note 125, at 210-11; see also Richard Murphy, The Brand 
X Constitution, supra note 306, at 1290 (“[A] dominant theme of Mead remains the Court’s 
effort to cabin the scope of Chevron deference with procedure”); Merrill, supra note 126, at 
814 (“One factor clearly deemed relevant by the majority was whether the statute ‘provides 
for a relatively formal procedure.’”).  
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should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”319  Had the AG used 
formal procedures, such procedural formality could have guarded against 
what amounted to an “‘authoritative’ production of unfair, inconsistent or 
arbitrary law.”320 
 
IV. Proposed Solutions 
 
This section discusses some different approaches to solve the 
problem unleashed by Attorney General Mukasey when he published the 
Silva-Trevino decision.  Each approach, however, is not a perfect fix; the 
proposed solutions and problems with each solution are discussed below.         
 
A. Courts Can Refuse Chevron Deference 
 
The primary solution proposed in this article is for courts to refuse 
deference to the agency’s decision in Silva-Trevino.  Courts can refuse 
deference under Chevron step zero; however, this requires wading through 
the murky waters of Mead and answering questions that courts may prefer 
to leave to law review articles.321  The first circuit court to consider whether 
to give Silva-Trevino deference, the Third Circuit in 2009 in Jean-Louis v. 
AG,322 did not consider the impact of the AG’s procedures, as this challenge 
was not raised by the petitioner.323  However, the court reasoned, “the lack 
of transparency, coupled with the absence of input by interested 
stakeholders, only serves to dissuade us further from deferring to the 
Attorney General’s novel approach.”324   
A solution of lesser resistance is for courts to refuse to defer to 
Silva-Trevino under Chevron step one, by reasoning that the word 
“convicted” in the relevant statutes indicates a clear Congressional 
preference for the categorical approach.325  This was the Third Circuit’s 
approach in Jean-Louis; the court held that the Attorney General’s “novel 
framework for determining whether a petitioner has been convicted of a 
                                                          
319 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230. 
320 See Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 91, at 1449. 
321 See, e.g., Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 91, at 1446 (“Because courts 
are insecure about Mead, many grant lower-level Skidmore deference in addition to or in 
lieu of Chevron deference.  Thus, courts engage in Mead-induced Chevron avoidance.”); 
cf. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1019 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is indeed a wonderful new world 
that the Court creates, one full of promises for administrative-law professors in need of 
tenure articles and, of course, for litigators.”). 
322 582 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2010). 
323 See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 417 n.11. 
324 Id. 
325 See Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 125; Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. at 513. 
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crime involving moral turpitude”326 should not command Chevron 
deference because the statute was clear.327  However, there is arguably some 
ambiguity when considering all of the relevant removal statutes.328               
If Silva-Trevino fails Chevron step zero, courts will analyze the case 
under the Skidmore factors, giving weight to the agency’s decision based on 
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, 
its consistency with earlier pronouncements and any other factors that give 
it “power to persuade.”329  Silva-Trevino will likely fail Skidmore review, 
mostly because the AG’s decision was entirely inconsistent with over a 
                                                          
326 Id. at 464. 
327 The Third Circuit in Jean-Louis decided that the Immigration and Nationality Act was 
clear and that the ambiguity described by Attorney General in Silva-Trevino was “an 
ambiguity of his own making, not grounded in the text of the statute, and certainly not 
grounded in the BIA’s own rulings or the jurisprudence of courts of appeals going back for 
over a century.”  Id. at 473; see also id. at 477 (reasoning that the AG’s division of the term 
“crime involving moral turpitude” into a noun and subordinate clause “distorts its intended 
meaning”).  The court cited longstanding case law that “the term ‘convicted’ forecloses 
individualized inquiry in an alien’s specific conduct and does not permit examination of 
extra-record evidence.”  Id. at 473-74 (citing Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. at 513).  
The court reasoned, “Congress prescribed a single definition of ‘convicted,’ applicable to 
all removable offenses,” so it was inconsistent with the statute to employ the categorical 
approach for removable offenses such as aggravated felonies, yet use the new approach for 
crimes involving moral turpitude.  Id. at 474-75.   
328 While Congress stated that only those “convicted” of a crime involving moral turpitude 
could be deported, the Immigration and Nationality Act renders inadmissible a noncitizen 
“convicted of, or who admits having committed or who admits committing acts which 
constitute the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude.”  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii); § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (emphasis added).  For all of these noncitizens 
attempting to overcome the ground of inadmissibility for a CIMT, the statutory language 
includes both convictions and admission to the essential elements of a CIMT; this language 
can create enough ambiguity for courts to give Chevron deference to the Attorney 
General’s decision in Silva-Trevino.  The amici argued that BIA and federal court decisions 
concluded that Congress intended, even when a noncitizen admits to the essential elements 
of a CIMT, to prevent judges from trying facts and underlying conduct.  See 
Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 26 (citing Howes v. Tozer, 3 F.2d 849, 852 (1st 
Cir. 1925); U.S. ex rel. Castro v. Williams, 203 F. 155, 156-67 (D. NY 1913)); see also id. 
at 22 (citing In re Seda, 17 I&N Dec. 550, 554 (BIA1980) and In re Winter, 12 I&N Dec. 
638, 642 (BIA 1967, 1968)).  However, the statutory term “admits” does appear to be 
ambiguous, unlike the term “convicted.”  Cf. Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. at 513 
(holding that “where a ground of deportability is premised on the existence of a 
‘conviction’ for a particular type of crime, the focus of the immigration authorities must be 
on the crime of which the alien was convicted, to the exclusion of any other criminal or 
morally reprehensible acts he may have committed.”).  As such, the agency can change its 
mind with respect to its meaning.  See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981. That new meaning, even 
if it conflicts with federal circuit court precedent, may command Chevron deference.  See 
id. 
329 See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
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century of immigration case law.330  Also, the AG’s decision does not 
demonstrate “thoroughness evident in its consideration,” as there were 
many errors of law in the decision.331  Thus, the likely result of Skidmore 
review will be a return to the status quo.   
Should there be a harder look at the use of the categorical approach 
in immigration cases?  The Supreme Court recently held that “the statute 
[INA] foresees the use of fundamentally fair procedures…But we do not 
agree that fairness requires the evidentiary limitations [of the categorical 
approach].”332  Some courts have questioned the approach as unduly 
formulaic, as the categorical approach requires the immigration judge to put 
on blinders as to what “really happened.”333  There are many prudential 
reasons to apply the categorical approach, above all because it spares 
immigration judges a retrial of the criminal case.334  However, the agency 
may wish to reconsider whether efficiency trumps all in the criminal 
removal context.  For these reasons, perhaps the solution of courts refusing 
Chevron deference to the Attorney General’s decision is not the only 
answer.           
 
B. The Agency Can Start Over, Ensuring More Process 
 
The agency can have a say in the overhaul of the categorical 
approach and still command Chevron deference by reconsidering the issue 
through the use of procedures that ensure more public input.  One option is 
for the agency to commence notice-and-comment rulemaking on the new 
moral turpitude test.335  Another option is for the agency to sua sponte 
                                                          
330 See id.; Mylius, 201 F. at 863. 
331 See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see also notes 204, 305, supra.   
332 See Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2303 (2009); see also In re Toro, 17 I&N Dec. 340, 343 
(BIA 1980) (holding that the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment requires removal 
proceedings to be fundamentally fair). 
333 See, e.g., Montero-Ubri v. INS, 229 F.3d 319, 321 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The push in the law 
toward categorical approaches to classifying crimes as either involving moral turpitude or 
not is largely based on the policy of not retrying prior criminal convictions in later 
deportation hearings.  No such interest is served by precluding consideration of basic facts 
stated on the official court records of the charging and conviction documents. The 
categorical approach does not require that blinders be worn.”); see also U.S. v. Miller, 478 
F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2007) (reasoning, in the sentencing context, that the “Taylor analysis 
is categorical, but an inquiring court has the right to draw reasonable inferences from the 
evidence... The court is not required either to wear blinders or to leave common sense out 
of the equation.”). 
334 See, e.g., NAIJ Statement, supra note 200.   
335 See AILF Letter, supra note 207; ABA Letter, supra note 199. 
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reconsider Silva-Trevino,336 this time inviting briefing from interested 
parties.337  
The rulemaking option was the solution that Attorney General 
Holder used when vacating In re Compean (“Compean I”),338 a January 7, 
2009, decision by the outgoing AG Mukasey.  In Compean I, AG Mukasey 
had decided that there was no right to effective assistance of counsel in 
removal cases; he reversed years of immigration precedent decisions that 
allowed noncitizens to reopen their cases based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel.339  In Compean I, however, AG Mukasey invited amicus briefing 
before his decision was final, thus guaranteeing input from the public on the 
drastic change in law.340  When there was significant public backlash 
against the decision, AG Holder vacated the opinion in June 2009.341  In 
Compean II, AG Holder stated: “I do not believe that the process used in 
Compean resulted in a thorough consideration of the issues involved, 
particularly for a decision that implemented a new, complex framework in 
place of a well-established and longstanding practice…”342  AG Holder 
decided to commence notice-and-comment rulemaking on the issue of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings.343  AG Holder can 
respond to the Silva-Trevino case with a similar tactic, by vacating the 
opinion and proposing regulations. 
There are several reasons why AG Holder may choose not to 
address Silva-Trevino in the same way as Compean I.  For one, the right to 
effective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings is a more politically 
safe battle to fight.  Noncitizens who have fallen prey to bad attorneys are 
perceived as victims; noncitizens who have been convicted of crimes rarely 
are viewed as victims.344  The right to effective assistance of counsel is a 
more straightforward issue than the categorical approach; thus the public 
may not understand the impact of Silva-Trevino.345  AG Holder also may 
not want the publicity of overruling Silva-Trevino, which can be viewed as 
                                                          
336 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).   
337 See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 58, at 7.   
338 See 24 I&N Dec. 710 (A.G. 2009). 
339 Compean I, 24 I&N Dec. at 712-13. 
340 See id. at 713-14. 
341 In re Compean, 25 I&N Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009) (“Compean II”). 
342 Id. at 2. 
343 Id. 
344 See generally ICE, “Criminal Alien Program,” available at 
http://www.ice.gov/partners/dro/cap.htm (“The Criminal Alien Program (CAP) focuses on 
identifying criminal aliens who are incarcerated within federal, state and local facilities 
thereby ensuring that they are not released into the community by securing a final order of 
removal prior to the termination of their sentence.”). 
345 Cf. Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2299 (reasoning that “the categorical method is not always 
easy to apply”). 
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a triumph of common sense (deport the child molester when a judge knows 
those were the facts) over creative lawyering (because the record of 
conviction does not show those facts, the child molester avoids 
deportation).  Finally, as notice-and-comment rulemaking is costly to the 
agency,346 AG Holder may not wish to spend the agency’s time on the new 
moral turpitude test, especially because the agency currently is in the 
process of writing regulations on the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in removal proceedings.   
Should the agency commence notice-and-comment rulemaking on 
the categorical approach, there is no guarantee that the end product will be 
any different than the AG’s decision in Silva-Trevino.  Scholars are 
skeptical of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process for its fanfare at 
the expense of real deliberation.347  Professor Donald Elliott has stated, 
 
No administration in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-
comment rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining 
input from interested parties.  Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to 
public participation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions 
– a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the 
essence of something which in real life takes place in other 
venues.348     
 
A cheaper, more efficient option is for AG Holder to reconsider 
Silva-Trevino, inviting interested parties to brief issues.  This technique has 
been used by the BIA and AGs in the past when the agency was considering 
a major change in policy through adjudication.349  As with rulemaking, 
                                                          
346 See Stephenson, supra note 93, at 546; Magill, supra note 91, at 1397. 
347 See Barron and Kagan, supra note 125, at 231-32; see also id. at 232 (“[N]otice-and-
comment rulemaking today tends to promote a conception of the regulatory process as a 
forum for competition among interest groups, rather than a means to further the public 
interest.”). 
348 Elliott, Re-inventing Rulemaking, supra note 136, at 1492-93.  Often, the venues in 
which the discussion takes place are informal conversations between agency staff and 
interested parties outside the agency, which allow for crucial input by the public before the 
agency publishes the notice of proposed rulemaking.  Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld, 
Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of 
Federal Power, 57 DUKE L. J. 1933, 1956-60 (2008) (discussing transparency in agency 
rulemaking, which occurs during the rule development, and stating, “[b]y the time an 
agency issues a [notice of proposed rulemaking], it has already invested much time and 
effort in developing the proposed rule and often does not change it in fundamental ways in 
response to comments.”). 
349 See, e.g., Compean I, 24 I&N Dec. at 713-14 (noting AG’s invitation to interested 
groups to brief changes to ineffective assistance of counsel policy); Reconsideration 
Memo, supra note 58, at 8-9 (citing In re Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516) (discussing Attorney 
General Reno’s invitation for briefing from interested parties on the retroactivity of 
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immigration advocates and judges would have an opportunity for input and 
thus could detail the benefits of using the categorical approach in removal 
proceedings.350  However, there is no guarantee that the agency will take the 
side of immigrants’ rights advocates (and immigration judges) and maintain 
the categorical approach.  Nonetheless, ensuring more process – either 
through rulemaking or adjudication with invitation for briefing – allows the 
agency to think about this major overhaul to the law before imposing it on 
affected parties.351  If the agency cannot give a reasoned response to a 
concern raised by commentators, a court can later reject the agency’s 
interpretation as arbitrary and capricious.352   
Attorney General Holder may avoid any reconsideration of Silva-
Trevino, perceiving that courts will not defer to the decision, as courts may 
interpret the word “conviction” to clearly indicate a Congressional 
preference for the categorical approach.353  Or, the AG may simply wait to 
see what courts will do with the decision.354  However, “one year and half 
after the issuance of Silva-Trevino – and thousands of petitions for review 
                                                                                                                                                   
changes to relief under former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) and noting that the decision addresses 
the points raised in the amicus briefs); see also Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 762-63 
(quoting Excelsior Underwear, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1238) (discussing how the NLRB had 
“invited certain interested parties” to file briefs and participate in oral arguments prior to its 
ruling in Excelsior Underwear, Inc., which set forth a new policy requiring employers to 
provide unions with lists of names of employees before elections).   
350 See, e.g., ABA Resolution, supra note 216; NAIJ Statement, supra note 200. 
351 See Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 148, at 1781; Anthony, Interpretive 
Rules, supra note 163, at 1373. 
352 See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43; Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419-20.  Scholars argue 
that the best way for an agency to anticipate potential problems with its decision is to open 
up the process to challengers before the decision is final; formal procedures facilitate this 
crucial input from the public.  See Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 148, at 
1781.  
353 See, e.g., Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 125; Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. at 513; 
but see note 328, supra (discussing ambiguity of the INA). 
354 Only one circuit court, the Third Circuit, has reviewed the Attorney General’s decision 
in Silva-Trevino and explicitly rejected the new test for determining whether an offense 
involves moral turpitude.  See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 478-80.  The Eighth Circuit recently 
held, without significant discussion, that it refused to apply Silva-Trevino because it 
conflicted with the court’s precedent.  See Guardado-Garcia, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS at *5-
6.  The Ninth Circuit declined to consider a challenge to the retroactive application of the 
Silva-Trevino framework; the court remanded the case because the petitioner’s hearing did 
not comport with due process.  See Castruita-Gomez, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18612 at *3-
4.  The Ninth Circuit also is considering another challenge to the Silva-Trevino framework; 
in both Ninth Circuit cases, immigrants’ rights organizations filed amicus briefs 
highlighting the various problems with the AG’s decision.  See Castruita-Gomez Amicus 
Brief, supra note 70; Zamudio-Ramirez Amicus Brief, supra note 70. 
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later – no circuit court has endorsed its radical framework.”355  Courts may 
be signaling to the agency that its failure to employ procedures that ensure 
public input means they have little faith in the Silva-Trevino decision.356   
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Attorney General Mukasey, in his last-minute decision in Silva-
Trevino, created a drastic change in immigration law by overhauling the 
categorical approach, which had been used by immigration judges for over 
a century to determine whether a noncitizen had been convicted of a CIMT.  
The AG made such a change through a process that allowed no input from 
parties affected by the change, including the individual whose case became 
the new precedent.  Courts examining this last minute overhaul should find 
that these procedures guaranteed neither transparency nor careful 
consideration, which are essential elements of lawmaking.  For this reason, 
courts should refuse deference at Chevron step zero, pursuant to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Mead.  An additional way to cure the 
procedural defects in the Silva-Trevino decision-making process is for AG 
Holder to reconsider the decision through either the notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process or allowing interested parties to brief the issues; either 
choice by the agency would allow public input on this significant change in 
immigration law.   
As AG Holder stated during his confirmation hearings, “I firmly 
believe that transparency is a key to good government.  Openness allows the 
public to have faith that its government obeys the laws.  Public scrutiny also 
provides an important check against unpersuasive legal reasoning – 
reasoning that is biased toward a particular conclusion.”357  The Attorney 
General should keep his promise, ensuring transparency and careful 
consideration in agency action – elements noticeably missing from his 
predecessor’s decision in Silva-Trevino.   
 
                                                          
355 Castruita-Gomez Amicus Brief, supra note 70, at 15-17 (discussing cases in which 
circuit courts have applied the traditional categorical approach notwithstanding the Silva-
Trevino decision).   
356 See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 471 n.11 (“[T]he lack of transparency, coupled with the 
absence of input by interested stakeholders, only serves to dissuade us further from 
deferring to the Attorney General’s novel approach.”). 
357 AILF Letter, supra note 207, at 3 (quoting Confirmation Hearings for AG Eric H. 
Holder, http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/111th 
CongressExecutiveNominations/upload/FeingoldToHolder.pdf (Question and Answer 2) 
(responding to question from Senator Feingold that addressed problems of “secret law” 
under the Bush administration). 
